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SEX MATTERS: CONSIDERING GENDER IN
CONSUMER CONTRACTING
AMY J. SCHMITZ*
We hear about the so-called "War on Women" and persisting salary gaps
between men and women in the popular media, but contracts scholars and
policymakers rarely discuss gender. Instead, dominant voices in the contracts field
often reflect classical and economics-driven theories built on assumptions of
gender neutral and economically rational actors. Furthermore, many mistakenly
assume that market competition and antidiscrimination legislation address any
improper biases in contracting. This Article therefore aims to shed light on
gender's importance by distilling data from my own e-survey of Colorado
consumers along with others' research regarding gender differences in contract
outcomes, interests and behaviors. In light of this research, the Article calls for
open discussion of gender in contract and consumer law. It also suggests ideas for
considering research findings and the importance of context in designing financial
literacy and contract education programs that acknowledge gender while honoring
individuality and avoiding stereotype reinforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
The so-called "War on Women" and persisting salary gaps between men and
women have caught the public eye. 1  Political conversations highlight
disagreements between and within the Republican and Democratic parties
regarding such "women's issues" as contraception and abortion. 2 At the same
time, some commentators argue that traditional male attributes are no longer
valued, and that concern for boosting girls' achievements has left boys behind. 3
The data on debt nonetheless reveals women's financial woes. Studies in the
lending industry indicate that brokers and financial institutions steer a
disproportionate share of women toward subprime loans despite credit worthiness
and capacity to repay on par with male borrowers.4 Bankruptcy data then adds to
this picture of women falling financially behind men by showing women filing for
bankruptcy in higher numbers than men. 5 Furthermore, Professor Ian Ayres
revealed discrimination in Chicago car sales with his finding that area male and
I See, e.g., Gary Shapiro, The Real War on Women, FORBES (June 13, 2012), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/garyshapiro/2012/06/13/the-real-war-on-women (noting the popularity of
war on women debates).
2 These sources highlight the 2012 Presidential election debates regarding "women's issues" and
the fight for female voters. See Jon Cohen & Krissah Thompson, Romney Wins Over Republican
Women, Shrinks Popularity Gap with Obama in New Poll, WASHINGTON POST (May 30, 2012),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-winning-over-gop-women-according-
to-new-poll/2012/05/30/gJQAB2Q21U story.html (discussing the importance of capturing women
voters and divisive issues such as fair pay and contraception); Associated Press, Senate GOP Blocks
Democrats' Equal Pay Bill, Fox NEWS (June 5, 2012), available at http://foxnews.com/us/2 012/06/05/obama-senate-dems-court-women-with-fair-pay-bill (highlighting political debates); Justin
Sink, Poll: Obama Edges Romney by 3 Points Nationwide, THE HILL (June 29, 2012),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/235693-poll-obama-edges-roney-by-3-points-
nationwide (highlighting the tight fight between Obama and Romney for women's votes).
3 See Cheryl Hanna, The Price She Pays, 10 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 815, 815-23 (2012)
(discussing Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, THE ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2010), available at
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-end-of-men/8135/#, and other similar articles).
4 See John Sarto, The Disproportionate Representation of Women in Subprime Lending: Cause,
Effect, and Remedies, 31 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 337, 349-53 (2011).
5 See Leslie E. Linfield, 2008 Annual Consumer Bankruptcy Demographics Report: American
Debtors in a Recession, INST. FOR FIN. LITERACY (June 2009), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-1414337. See also infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing further data indicating
female overrepresentation in bankruptcy).
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female salespersons alike charged significantly higher prices to female and
minority consumers than to white men regardless of market competition. 6
Despite this research, there is a surprising silence about gender in contracts
and commercial law and literature.7 This flows from classical contract law.
Contract law is built on classical liberalism, which assumes a free market filled
with actors who have the requisite power to compete for goods and services.8
Classical law requires strict promise enforcement aimed to promote market
certainty and long-term planning in an industrial society. Law and economics
theory, predominant in contract law, adds to classical notions by further promoting
strict contract enforcement with an aim toward advancing economic efficiency. It
presumes that decision-makers and contracting individuals are gender and race
neutral, and act in economically wise ways that will result in optimal economic
efficiency. The assumption is that the market is efficient enough to address any
discrimination. 9
Contracts scholars then usually avoid addressing gender biases or differences
among men and women with respect to contracting perceptions, behaviors, and
interests. 10 Although this may be due in large part to the dominance of classical
and economics-oriented voices, it also coincides with the academic tendency to
separate contract from civil rights law by a private/public dichotomy. This
artificial dichotomy assumes that "public" constitutional and anti-discrimination
laws address any improper inequalities, and "private" law covering transactions
need not foray into policy or context." In reality, however, policy and contextual
issues pervade contract and commercial law in action.
Furthermore, constitutional constraints only come into play when state action
is involved, and the limited statutes prohibiting gender discrimination in
contracting generally target discrimination in limited contexts. 12 Although there is
a patchwork of laws outlawing gender discrimination in lending, housing, and
6 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARv. L. REv. 817, 817-19 (1991).
7 See Hila Keren, "We Insist! Freedom Now": Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything
Constitutional to Say?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 133-41, 154-56 (2005) (emphasizing how contract
law has ignored discrimination).
8 See Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 ND. L. REv. 1247, 1249-50, 1259-65
(1999) (exploring how contract law has been mistakenly deemed immune from male bias, and arguing
that contract law is susceptible to sexism).
9 See Keren, supra note 7, at 155-57. The author discusses these arguments and Professor Richard
Epstein's claim "that anti-discrimination laws create more injustices than they can repair." Id. at 156.
10 See Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social Cognitive
Analysis, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 203-11 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006) (noting
scarcity of investigation regarding gender's role in negotiating behavior).
11 See Keren, supra note 7, at 159-61 (discussing the public/private divide).
12 See, e.g., Alabama Fair Housing Law, ALA. CODE § 24-8-1 (1975); Arkansas Fair Housing Act,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-201 (2005); Arkansas Equal Consumer Credit Act of 1975, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-87-101 (1975) (consumer contracts); Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1747 (1971) (credit contracts); California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV. CODE §
12900 (housing and employment).
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employment contexts, there are few laws addressing discrimination in consumer
contracting generally.13 Moreover, these laws are largely ineffective with respect
to subtle biases and misuse of stereotypes.
In addition, it is very difficult for one to prove discrimination. Claimants
face a tough burden in gathering data and trying to prove disparate treatment, let
alone disparate impact based on a business's particular practices. 14 Furthermore,
this is especially tough with respect to lending or other contracting because lenders
and merchants can easily explain away actions by citing indeterminate business
factors. This is in part why, for example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA") has done little to stop discriminatory lending.15
General consumer protection laws also may allow gender discrimination to
persist in subtle ways. For example, commentators have criticized the Federal
Reserve's ruling pursuant to the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and
Disclosure ("CARD") Act of 2009 as severely restricting stay-at-home mothers'
access to credit. 16 The seemingly neutral rule that became effective on October 1,
2011, prevents credit card issuers from continuing to consider household income
when assessing creditworthiness. 17 Instead, issuers must focus only on an
individual's "independent ability." These regulations can be beneficial by
preventing consumers from accumulating debt they cannot repay, but even CARD
Act authors have criticized the regulations as creating "a serious risk for women in
abusive domestic partnerships" who do not jointly own accounts of their partners
and need to build credit histories to forge a path out of abusive relationships.18
At the same time, anti-discrimination laws and policies promoting gender
diversity must generally remain vague in order to avoid crossing constitutional
13 See Keren, supra note 7, at 133, 140-44 (highlighting the patchwork of antidiscrimination law
and problems for practical enforcement).
14 See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63
FLA. L. REv. 251, 297-98 (2011) (noting the difficult burden to bring a disparate impact case); Plummer
v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., Inc., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A civil rights plaintiff has a
difficult burden of proof, and should not be deprived of what may be persuasive evidence.").
15 See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debt Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,
173, n.153 (2009) ("[L]enders continue to deny loans to creditworthy consumers and practice gender
and spousal discrimination[]" despite passage of the ECOA) (quoting Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender,
"Redlining, " and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: A Historical and
Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950-
1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 583, 585-86 (1996)).
16 See Martin Merzer, Fed Rule Limits Credit Cards for Stay-at-Home Parents,
CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/stay-at-home-parent-credit-cards-
household-income-1282.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (highlighting criticisms of the new regulations).
17 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123
Stat. 1736 (2009). The CARD Act is codified in the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1666j. The
regulations appear at 76 Fed. Reg. 22948-01 (Apr. 25, 2011), Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a), and
Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a) (Supp. 1).
18 Merzer, supra note 16 (quoting U.S. Reps. Carolyn Maloney, D-NY, and Louise Slaughter, D-
NY, principal authors of the CARD Act). Note that the regulation could harm any partner or spouse-
male or female-who is without significant outside income or credit history for building a credit score.
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lines by creating quotas or other special rights for any particular group. 19 For
example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank") 20 requires each federal agency to create an Office of Minority and
Women Inclusion ("OMWI") to promote "fair inclusion and utilization" of
minorities and women in agency business. 2 1 Under this vague charge, agencies
such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), which establishes
consumer protections for financial products and services, have done little to no
implementation. 22
There also are additional budgetary constraints and policy concerns regarding
government initiatives and protections for women in contracting. 23 Government
action requires allocation of limited public resources, and policymakers need more
research regarding the existence and extent of gender discrimination and
differences in private contracting. There also are valid concerns about how to
design any sort of law or regulation that would address subtle gender biases and
behavioral differences without reinforcing stereotypes, making improper
assumptions about women and men, or otherwise overstepping into paternalism.
The available data nonetheless suggests that it is time to end the silence, and
engage in open and honest discussion of gender in consumer contracting. Classical
contract assumptions and law and economics theory have failed to properly address
law in action, let alone gender's role in real-world contracting. The reality is that
individuals are not all economically rational actors with perfect information.
Instead, they may fall prey to contracting pitfalls. In addition, the existing data
suggests that women have fallen financially behind men when it comes to debt
19 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (holding medical school set-
aside for minority applicants unconstitutional); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
497-507 (1989) (striking as unconstitutional the City's requirement that its prime contractors subcontract
at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to minority-owned businesses); but see Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003) (upholding a law school's narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining a diverse student body); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law for women in that
particular instance due to clear evidence of the disparity in bargaining power suffered by women seeking
employment at that time).
20 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
21 Dodd-Frank § 342, 12 U.S.C. § 5452(a)(1). The OMWI does not, however, have civil rights
compliance authority. Id. § 5452(a)(2).
22 See, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Hires Stuart Ishimaru to Head the Office of
Minority and Women Inclusion, CFPB (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-hires-stuart-ishimaru-to-head-the-office-of-
minority-and-women-inclusion/ (explaining that the newly appointed director of the OMWI must
operate with little to no administrative or financial support). See also 12 U.S.C. § 5452(a)(1)(B) for the
directive to the Bureau to establish an OMWI within the proscribed time period; see 12 U.S.C. §
5301(2)(4) for explanation that "Bureau" means the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Note
that this article refers to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as both "CFPB" and "Bureau."
23 Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Women at the Bargaining Table: Pitfalls and Prospects, 25
NEGOTIATION J. 233, 243-44 (2009) (emphasizing how women resist admission of differences or
biases).
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loads and consumer pricing. 24 This impacts not only women's finances, but also
their physical and emotional health-as well as the health of their children and
families. 25
This Article therefore invites consideration of gender differences and biases
in consumer contracting. Gender issues should no longer lurk in the shadows of
"political correctness" or assumptions that women have attained full equality with
men in the marketplace. Instead, gender is among the contextual factors that play
an important role in what I term "contracting culture."26 This conception of
culture builds on relational and behavioral theories to view exchanges in light of a
wide range of economic and non-economic factors that impact parties' contracts. 27
Gender is salient in this contracting culture because female consumers may
have different interests, understandings, and styles with respect to borrowing
money, purchasing products, and making other contract decisions. 28 Although all
women are by no means the same, the data is worth considering because it may
influence how companies market to and deal with women versus men. As noted
above, the limited data that exists suggests that treatment differentials may result in
women obtaining less financially attractive loans, which may help explain why
more women than men file for bankruptcy. 29
This Article, therefore, aims to spark further research, as well as
acknowledgement and discussion regarding gender in contract law and policy. 30
Part I of the Article sheds light on why gender matters by distilling data from my
own e-survey of Colorado consumers along with others' research regarding gender
differences in contract outcomes, interests and behaviors. Part II then discusses the
statutory and common contract law that has failed to adequately address gender
discrimination and differences, and Part III contrasts that law with more nuanced
24 See Linda Barkacs & Stephen Standifird, Gender Distinctions and Empathy in Negotiation, 12 J.
ORG. CULTURE COMM. & CONFLICT 83 (2008) (providing research indicating that there are real
differences-but calling for further consideration of research to inform policy).
25 See Deborah Thorne, Women 's Work, Women 's Worry? Debt Management in Financially
Distressed Families, in BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 136 (Katherine Porter ed.,
2012) (discussing the impact of debt on women and their families, especially since women take
responsibility for paying bills and managing debt).
26 Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions,
81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 123 (2007) [hereinafter Schmitz, Contracting Culture]. I have proposed a
continuum analysis of contracting cultures ranging from "intra communal" to "extra communal" based
on parties' relations, understandings, and values. I place contracts that businesses offer to consumers-
business-to-consumer, or "B2C" contracts-at the extra communal end of the continuum due to
consumers' lack of connections or shared interests with companies that employ these adhesive contracts.
27 Id. See also LARRY A. DIMATrEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY 7-8 (Carolina Acad.
Press 2007) (noting works in this area by Professor Blake Morant); Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E. A.
Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the Beholder, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 249, 250-53 (1991)
(highlighting the importance of considering cultural differences relating to ethnicity, nationality, race,
gender, and age).
28 Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 203.
29 Id.; infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (citing studies).
30 Broad discussion of Dodd-Frank and CFPB powers and policies are beyond the scope of this
article.
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consideration of context under relational and critical theories. Part IV calls for
further research, and use of that research in designing contextually cognizant
financial literacy and contracting education programs that acknowledge gender
while remaining careful to honor individuality and avoid stereotype reinforcement.
I. EMPIRICAL AND COGNITIVE RESEARCH REGARDING ROLES OF GENDER IN
CONTRACTING
Consideration of gender in contracting should begin with the data to
determine the existence and extent of gender differences in contract outcomes and
behaviors. This contributes to an understanding of law in action, including
individuals' different motivations, behaviors, and understandings in varied
exchange contexts. 3 1 Although there is need for more research, available data
suggests that women may obtain less advantageous sales and loan contracts than
men, and are overrepresented in bankruptcy. Furthermore, other research suggests
that stereotypes and biases, along with gender differences in contract behaviors and
interests, may hinder women's financial success in the marketplace.
A. Deals and Debt Outcomes
Although more research is needed, the research to date generally suggests
that women often obtain less economically beneficial contracts than men obtain.
For example, Ian Ayres tested whether women and minorities were given worse
deals in purchasing cars in metropolitan Chicago. 32 He found that salespersons
offered better prices to white men than to female and minority consumers although
the car dealerships systematically steered the tester-buyers to salespersons who
shared their gender and race characteristics. 33 Specifically, white women had to
pay forty percent higher prices than white men, regardless of market competition
that should have eliminated such discrimination. 34 In addition, he found that
salespersons offered higher prices to black men and the highest prices to black
women.35
31 Despite emerging research, there is still a need for more empirical studies exploring consumer
attitudes and behavior with respect to form contracts. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate:
Would Mandatory Website Disclosure ofE-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 856 n.24
(2006); see also Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts? I (University
of Pennsylvania Working Paper No. WP-06-11, 2007), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/
-souleles/research/papers/ContractChoice _1207s.pdf (reporting credit card study); Victoria C. Plaut &
Robert P. Bartlett Ill, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-
Through Agreements, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 16 (2011) (discussing how the non-readership of online
contracts cuts across gender, demographic and personality characteristics).
32 Ayres, supra note 6, at 819.
33 Id. at 827-28. The author also showed how salespersons asked buyers different questions and
used disparate sales tactics depending on the buyer's race and gender. Id. at 819.
34 Id. at 819, 821. The author noted others' animus-based theories of discrimination and providing
further detail regarding the research methodology and findings. Id at 822-43.
35 Id. at 828, 831.
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Similarly, researchers who conducted a later study of Chicago car sales also
found that salespersons' initial and final offers were higher to women than to
men. 36 This was true even when all participants completed the same negotiation
training and believed they had negotiated good deals. 37 In addition, other studies
in California suggested that hairdressers, drycleaners, and perfume merchants were
charging women higher prices than they charge men, without valid justification. 38
Although the data is limited and mixed, most research in lending contexts
also indicates that company representatives may provide the best deals to white
male consumers. 39 For example, studies in the United States have shown that
lenders may steer minorities and women toward subprime and less desirable loans
although they could qualify for prime mortgages. 4 0 Thirty-two percent of women
borrowers received subprime loans versus twenty-four percent of male borrowers in
a 2005 Consumer Federation of American ("CFA") study.4 1 Furthermore, a 2006
CFA study concluded that lenders were five times more likely to saddle upper
income black women than upper income white men with a subprime mortgage. 4 2
This results in women being more likely than similarly situated men to hold
subprime mortgages. It also may help explain why more women than men face
foreclosure. 43 Notably, these women include middle class and poor, as well as old
and young. Indeed, the foreclosure crisis has disproportionately burdened families
headed by single women. 44
Research abroad also has indicated that women pay more for financing. For
example, researchers found that women in Italy paid higher interest rates than men
on lines of credit used for their small businesses. 45 This was true after controlling
36 Barkacs & Standifird, supra note 24, at 88 (discussing a 2007 study by Lewicki & Sanders).
37 Id. at 88-89.
38 See also Harvard Law Review Association, Civil Rights-Gender Discrimination-California
Prohibits Gender-Based Pricing-Cal. Civ. Code § 51.6 (West Supp. 1996), 109 HARV. L. REv. 1839,
1840, 1844 n.1 (1996) (discussing studies finding gender discrimination in pricing for clothing, perfume,
and other sundries. Id. at 1844 n.28) [hereinafter Civil Rights].
39 Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Diference in Negotiation Outcome: A Meta
Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653 (1999) (digesting research indicating gender differences, but
noting some studies revealing no gender differences in outcomes).
40 See Carol Necole Brown, Women and Subprime Lending: An Essay Advocating Self-Regulation
of the Mortgage Lending Industry, 43 IND. L. REV. 1217, 1217-22 (2010) (compiling research regarding
discriminatory lending). The research has left many people-including the author-asking: "Why would
people who could qualify for prime mortgage loans end up with subprime loans?" Id. at 1217.
41 Sarto, supra note 4, at 342 (reporting the finding that of these 32% of women, 11% held
especially high-cost subprime mortgages versus only 7.7% of men).
42 Isabelle Agier & Ariane Szafarz, Credit to Women Entrepreneurs: The Curse of the
Trustworthier Sex 1-23 (2011), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.1718574.
43 See Sarto supra note 4, at 338 (discussing research and policy regarding gender and debt).
44 Id. at 340-42.
45 Alberto Alesina & Francesca Lotti, Do Women Pay More for Credit? Evidence from Italy 2, 18
(Harv. Inst. of Econ. Res. Discussion Paper No. 2159, 2008) (revised Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/alesina/files/Do%20Women%2Pay%/ 20More%20for%/ 2OCr
edit-Evidence%20from%20Italy.pdf (examining a large data set of lines-of-credit provided by banks in
Italy).
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for risk factors, credit history, and any other differences in business, borrower or
market characteristics, and despite evidence that the female borrowers were likely
safer credit risks.46  The researchers proposed that although all borrowers
benefitted from "social capital" built through establishing relationships with
lenders, men reaped greater benefits from these relationships. A similar study in
Brazil found that lenders offered smaller loans to women regardless of likely ability
to repay. 47
Studies also have suggested that credit card companies generally charge
higher interests rates to female versus male cardholders. 4 8  For example,
researchers found that the women in a recent FINRA study paid half a percentage
point more in credit card interest than the men, regardless of demographic
characteristics or financial literacy levels. 4 9  This was surprising in light of
evidence suggesting that financial literacy would mitigate problematic credit card
behaviors. Moreover, the seemingly small percentage point spread between men
and women raised reason for concern because it could lead women to pay
thousands of dollars more than men over a long period of time. 50
In addition, other research has highlighted the cumulative effects of debt and
low salaries on women. Data suggests that higher credit card interest rates and
reliance on credit cards combine with lower salaries to produce higher debt loads
for women than men.51 These loads are likely to include not only credit card debt,
but also student loans. One study reported that among workers in 2004 aged
twenty-five to thirty-four, twenty-three percent of women as compared with sixteen
percent of men with bachelor's degrees spent over ten percent of their earnings
repaying student loans. 52
Evidence also indicates that financial stresses and targeted marketing may
push more women than men into riskier debt contracts like payday loans, which
usually have effective APRs exceeding three-hundred percent. For example, a
2010 study reported as an average that sixty-four percent of the visitors to eighteen
46 Id. at 8, 19 (noting that female-run businesses had a lower failure rate than male-run businesses
during the data set period, and acknowledging that the results could have stemmed in part from the
Italian notion of "traditional" women and the nominal number of women on the boards of Italian banks).
47 Agier & Szafarz, supra note 42, at 11 (concluding in this study of the Brazilian microfinance
institution Vivacred that men often reap greater financial benefit than women from relationships with
lenders).
48 See Gary R. Mottola, In Our Best Interest: Women, Financial Literacy and Credit Card
Behavior, INSIGHTS: AMERICAN FINANCIAL CAPABILITY, FINRA INVESTOR EDUCATION FOUNDATION
(April 2012), http://www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/documents/
foundation/pl25971.pdf (reporting findings).
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. (noting that more research is needed to understand this surprising finding).
51 See Jeremy M. Simon, Young Women Suffer From Greater Debt, CREDIT CARD.COM (Oct. 17,
2006), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/young-women-suffer-from-greater-debt.php
(discussing research on gender and debt).
52 Id.
4452013]
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different internet payday loan sites in November of that year were female. 53
Researchers using 2007 Federal Reserve data similarly reported that a
disproportionate number of households headed by women use payday loans as
compared with households headed by men or married couples. 54 Studies in
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Colorado also indicated predominance of women among
payday loan consumers in those states. 55 Similarly, researchers found that twenty-
five percent more women than men use payday loans in Britain due in large part to
marketing targeting women. 56
Financially unattractive loan and other contracts may help explain why data
consistently indicate that women file for bankruptcy more often than men do.57 As
part of the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, researchers studied approximately
2500 bankruptcy cases, 58 and Professor Robert Lawless calculated that 55.5% of
all the respondents in that study were female, including single filers, one of two
joint filers, and non-filing spouses of a single filer.59 He also calculated that 67.3%
of the solo filers without another person in their homes were women, indicating the
significant overrepresentation of single women in bankruptcy. 60 Similarly, Leslie
Linfield found that 52.8% of the bankruptcy filers in her study were female in 2007
53 Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday and Title Loans
Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 524, 534-35, 561 n.44 (2012) (discussing the
study). Furthermore, it seemed that a significant portion of these women were single moms because
over half of the payday loan consumers reported children seventeen years or younger in the household.
Id. at 535-46 (noting additional studies indicate the prevalence of single mothers as among payday loan
borrowers).
54 Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Pan, Do Payday Lenders Target Minorities?, LIBERTY STREET
ECONoMics BLOG, (Feb. 8, 2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/02/do-payday-
lenders-target-minorities.html (finding that users of payday loans are worse off economically than non-
users).
55 Martin & Longa, supra note 53, at 542. The authors noted statistics for Illinois and Wisconsin.
Id. at 548, 550; ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COLORADO UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (UCCC),
Payday Lending Demographic and Statistical Information: July 2000 through December 2009, 1-4
(revised March 8, 2010), available at http://www.coloradoattomeygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/DDLASummary2009corr.pdf (reporting predominance of women in terms of payday loan
consumers in Colorado from 2001 through 2009).
56 Ruth Lythe, How Women Are Being Seduced into Debt by Payday Parasites: 'Instant' Cash
Firms with Interest Rates as High as 16,000% are Ruining Lives, DAILY MAIL, (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:27
AM), www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2094115/lnstant-money-loans-Payday-loan-firms-ruining-lives.
html (describing advertisements placed during TV shows targeting women, and payday loan websites
showing young women using payday loans to make them "glamorous").
57 Linfield, supra note 5, at 4.
ss Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 Am. BANKR. L.J. 349, 354-55 (2008). Researchers also examined written surveys and
answers from hundreds of telephone interviews of families whose bankruptcies were part of the sample.
Id. at 388-89.
59 E-mail from Robert M. Lawless to Amy J. Schmitz (Monday, July 16, 2012) (on file with author)
(reporting the data).
60 E-mail from Robert M. Lawless to Amy J. Schmitz (Monday, July 18, 2012) (on file with author)
(indicating this calculation based on the data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project and explaining how
although it is possible that single women were more likely to answer the survey, that seems unlikely
because the financial variables in the bankruptcy schedules for nonrespondents looked similar to the
respondents). Professor Lawless also noted, however, that there was no gender effect on filer choice
between chapter 7 versus chapter 13.
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and 52.6% were female in 2008.61 Furthermore, Elizabeth Warren reported data
indicating that women outnumbered men by roughly 150,000 in 2001, and that
almost 40% of those filing for bankruptcy in the 1999 Consumer Bankruptcy
Project study were divorced or single women. 62
Accordingly, sex matters from empirical and policy perspectives. Although
there is need for more research regarding gender differences with respect to
consumer contracting and pricing, the available data suggests that women may
receive less financially attractive sales and loan contracts, which may lead to higher
debt loads for women. This may be due to not only overt or subtle biases, but also
differences in behaviors and priorities in borrowing money, buying products, and
making other contracts.
B. Risk Aversion
Most individuals are risk-averse. 63 Women, however, tend to be more risk-
averse than men in negotiation studies. 64 This can be good and bad with respect to
contracting. Risk avoidance can lead to responsible borrowing and purchasing.
However, it also can hinder women from advancing in their careers, asking for
better prices or contracts, investing in an economically optimal manner for their age
or otherwise achieving financial success on par with men.
Risk aversion may help women in buying insurance. Female participants in
one experiment involving choice of insurance coverage chose disaster coverage
more frequently than male participants. 65 However, it may lead women to buy
extended service contracts, which consumer advocates generally advise not to
purchase. One study reported that women were more attracted to these contracts
when the data was viewed in light of other consumer characteristics, product
attributes and marketing strategies. 66 Nonetheless, the men in another study were
more likely to purchase extended warranties when the warranties were presented to
cover replacement costs. 67
61 See Linfield, supra note 5, at 4 (using data on clients in credit counseling).
62 Elizabeth Warren, What is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-
Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 21-28 (2002) (discussing the data and proposing how
commercial law involves significant "women's issues").
63 Melanie Powell & David Ansic, Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour in Financial Decision-
Making: An Experimental Analysis, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 605, 615 (1997) (reporting results from
experiments).
64 Id. at 622; Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 206-07.
65 Powell & Ansic, supra note 63, at 615 (noting women chose cover less frequently for damage).
66 See Tao Chen et al., Why Do Consumers Buy Extended Service Contracts?, 36 J. CONSUMER
RES. 611, 613-15 (2009) (noting no statistically significant correlation based on gender per se but
indicating that there was some suggestion that female risk-aversion was important when considered in
light of other factors).
67 Id. at 621 (finding overall that low-income consumers were most likely to buy extended
warranties due to concern they could not replace broken products).
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My own e-survey research of Colorado consumer behaviors and perceptions
also suggests that women are more concerned than men that purchases will go
awry.68 In my sample of 306 completed surveys, 73.5% of female versus 56.3% of
male respondents considered warranty terms "very important" or "somewhat
important" in purchasing a new cellular phone. 69 Similarly, when asked to think
generally about the times they had looked at contract terms with respect to their
consumer purchases, 82% of female versus 69.9% of male respondents said that
warranties are "very important." 70
Risk-aversion may translate into market hesitance. In a study measuring
participants' decisions about entering or leaving an unfamiliar currency market, the
female participants left the market more quickly regardless of re-entry costs. 7 1 In
addition, the male participants were more willing than the women to remain in the
market when prices fell, and to accept the possibility of unknown losses. 72 This
was true although all study participants had equal education and experience in this
market. 73
Women may benefit from leaving a market to avoid loss. However, it also
may lead women to seek "safer" and thus suboptimal investment strategies.
Investment advisors also may presume women are risk-averse, and therefore steer
female clients away from what may ultimately result in the best investment
strategies for their age and overall retirement portfolio. 74 Women unwilling to
68 See Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Survey, Data and Notes (2007 to present) (unpublished survey,
data and files held by author) [hereinafter Schmitz, Survey Notes]. I worked with the Institute for
Behavioral Science (IBS) at the University of Colorado and Survey Sampling International (SSI) in
order to ensure confidentiality and full approval by the Human Research Council at the University of
Colorado. The survey was sent to roughly 10,000 Colorado residents over 18 years old in October and
November of 2007 in order to ultimately produce a sample of 306 properly completed surveys. Prior to
that time, we had dropped from our sample any partial responses or responses that were otherwise faulty
due to skipped questions, "flat-lined" responses, and other indications that the respondent "cheated" in
some way. Through our attempts to gather more male responses, we learned that women are much more
receptive to answering online surveys.
69 Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Survey Results (2007 to present) (survey data attached as Appendix
due to direct relevance to this discussion) [hereinafter Schmitz, Consumer Survey]. The sample
identified as three quarters Caucasian or white and reported varying levels of education, with 43%
having Bachelor's or post-graduate degrees, 44% completing some college but no degree, and the rest
having a high school diploma or less. Forty-two percent reported full-time employment, 16 % reported
part-time jobs, and the rest reported no employment outside the home. Many did not identify
themselves with respect to occupation. Of the 82% of those that reported income, roughly 30% were
under $29,999, 30% $30,000-49,000, 19% $50,000-$74,999, 9.6% $75,000-$99,999, and 11.2% over
$100,000; see id. at Section 1, Question 5 with respect to cell phone warranties (attached as Appendix).
70 Id. at Section 2, Question 7(f) (attached as Appendix) (measuring importance on a scale of
"very", "somewhat", "minor", or "not" important). Note that the result may not be that strong to the
extent that 28.2% male versus 16% of female respondents indicated "somewhat"-which could be seen to
slightly balance out the significance if one combines "very" and "somewhat."
71 Powell & Ansic, supra note 63, at 615-23 (showing different strategies of men and women in
financial decision-making, with women indicating lower preference for risk than men).
72 Id. at 620.
73 Id. at 623.
74 Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Sex Differences and Statistical Stereotyping in
Attitudes Toward Financial Risk, 23 EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 281, 290-92 (2002) (noting
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remain in the market during times of setback are likely to take immediate losses
and miss out on market gains. 75 Women who fear risk also may take lower-paying
jobs. 76
Other studies also have suggested women's propensity for risk aversion in
most aspects of their lives. 77 However, women indicated more preference for risk
than men in only one area: social decisions.7 8 This is not surprising in light of
research suggesting that social conditioning pressures women to do what it takes to
gain social acceptance. 79  Data indicates, for example, that need for social
acceptance leads girls to take more risks at same-sex schools. 80
This and other research indicates that female risk-aversion is not inherent, but
is the result of social conditioning. 81 As with any generalization or stereotype,
risk-aversion is not true for all women. The research regarding gender differences
with respect to risk is somewhat mixed. 82 Still, the overall research supports a
conclusion that women tend to be more risk-averse, which may help women in
making some contracting choices, but also may hinder women in achieving
financial success. 83
C. Lower Expectations and Less Confidence
Risk aversion often dovetails with lower expectations and lack of confidence,
which may impact contract and negotiation behaviors and outcomes. 84  For
how advisors may steer women toward overly low-risk investments, resulting in lower earnings and
suboptimal investment portfolios overall for female clients).
75 Id. at 281-95.
76 Alison Booth & Patrick Nolen, Gender Differences in Risk Behaviour: Does Nurture Matter?
(IZA Discussion Paper No. 4026, 2010) (concluding that girls' socially conditioned risk-aversion may
dissuade them from taking high-paying jobs due to uncertainty).
77 Elke U. Webster et al., A Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude Scale: Measuring Risk Perceptions and
Risk Behaviors, J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 263 (2002).
78 Id. at 282-83.
79 See Booth & Nolen, supra note 76, at 5 (analyzing results of study comparing risk-aversion
among girls at single-sex versus coed schools).
s0 Id.
81 Id.
82 Although most research indicates that men take greater risks in decision-making than women,
women in one study made riskier supplier choices than men when the decision was framed as a gain.
James E. Stoddard & Edward F. Fern, Risk-Taking Propensity in Supplier Choice: Differences by Sex
and Decision Frame in a Simulated Organizational Buying Context, 16 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 563,
568-70 (1999) (noting that the study involved university students and there was no measurable
difference when framed as a loss).
83 See Richard T. Bliss et al., Decision Making and Risk Aversion in the Cash Cab, 22-25 (2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-18181 4 5 (reporting study results regarding game show contestants'
behaviors and outcomes, and finding women more risk-averse); Daniel K.N. Johnson & Tracy R.
Gleason, Who REALLY Wants to Be a Millionaire: Game Show Contestant Behavior Under Risk 4-19
(Colorado College Working Paper No. 2005-02, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-847848
(examining gender differences in behaviors and outcomes of contestants on the game show "Who Wants
to Be a Millionaire," and finding that although the women on the show may be less risk-averse due to
self selection, men attained much greater winnings than women and think less about risks of negative
outcomes).
84 See Susan W. Coleman & Dorothy E. Weaver, Women and Negotiation: Tips from the Field, 18
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example, one who does not expect or believe he or she deserves a raise or a better
price will not even ask for it. In contrast, one who confidently asks for a raise or
better deal citing reasons why he or she deserves it is much more likely to get it.
This is not surprising or revolutionary. However, the available data, at least in the
employment context, suggests that this lack of confidence and lower expectations
perpetuates gender inequities and salary differentials because women are less likely
than men to ask for a raise. 85
Studies also show that setting lower goals leads to less favorable contract
outcomes for women, even when they share equal experience and education with
their negotiation opponents. 86 For example, men in one mock salary negotiation
study involving MBA students set goals nearly five percent higher than the women
set, even though participants shared identical education and tactical knowledge. 87
As a result, the men in the study achieved higher salaries than the women.88
Although that is in the employment context, data also shows that lower
expectations and confidence dissuade women from using complaint systems to
obtain remedies for claims against vendors. 89
The women in my e-survey also indicated less confidence than the men in
obtaining contract changes. Overall, the respondents indicated skepticism
regarding their power to negotiate purchase terms, but this was especially true for
the women in the survey. When the respondents were asked their level of
agreement with various statements regarding form purchase terms, 68.8% of the
female versus 61.1% of the men said "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" that
they "assume [they] cannot get a seller to change form terms." 90 This was a
statistically significant difference indicating that the women had slightly lower
expectations with respect to negotiating purchase terms. 9 1
No. 3 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 12, 18 (2012) ("[I]f [women] believe [they] are unworthy, then it become self-
fulfilling prophecy[.]").
85 See Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER
DIVIDE (2003); see generally Coleman & Weaver, supra note 84, at 15 (noting gender imbalances,
gendered salary differentials for equal work, and female responsibilities for most of the housework in
dual-eaming households).
86 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral
Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 116-20, 125-26 (2008) (discussing research
regarding gender in negotiations); Babcock & Laschever, supra note 85, at 1-4 (addressing the "voice"
inside many women's heads telling them they should be happy with what they have and not greedily ask
for more).
87 Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 205.
88 Id. (reporting results from a sales study, in which the male buyers set goals that were 9.8% more
aggressive that those set by female buyers).
89 Wendy Reiboldt, Complaint Behavior and Satisfaction with Complaint Outcome: A Look at
Gender Diferences, 2002 CONSUMER INTERESTS ANNUAL 1, 1-4 (reporting survey results of consumers
who used a third party complaint handling in California).
90 Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 69, Section II, Question 6b (attached as Appendix G).
91 Id. This was only approaching significance, but nonetheless shows slightly less confidence on
the women's part.
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Women's lower expectations may also have translated into greater inertia in
seeking contract changes. Although only 8.6% of all respondents said that they
"frequently" or "nearly all the time" seek to negotiate their consumer purchase
terms, 92 it was significant that 71.3% of female as compared with 53.4% of male
respondents reported that they "never" or "rarely" try to negotiate form terms.
9 3
Furthermore, 20.4% of male versus 9.9% of female respondents reported that they
had been able to get companies to change warranty terms in their consumer form
contracts. 94  Similarly, 20.4% of male versus 12.3% of female respondents
successfully negotiated changes with respect to interest rates for their credit
payments. 95
One unscientific poll of women in the business world confirmed female
propensity to undervalue themselves and set lower expectations. 96 When asked to
rate their level of agreement with statements on a 1-10 scale (with 10 showing
highest level of agreement), the female respondents assigned an average of 8 to "I
am afraid I under value myself" versus 5.4 to "I believe I fairly value myself." The
average rating of agreement with "It is difficult for me to make an aggressive first
offer" was 8.3, and 8.2 with "It is difficult for me to make a counter-offer."9 7
Nonetheless, these same respondents averaged 7.7 in agreement with "I consider
myself to be an assertive woman."98 Again, this poll data was unscientific and
lacked comparison data with male responses, but nonetheless sheds light on female
self-perceptions-even among businesswomen.
Perceptions, expectations, and confidence matter. 99  Individuals who
approach contracts and negotiations with less confidence regarding their bargaining
skills lower their goals and expectations. This is important with respect to gender
because women generally report less confidence than men in facing contract
negotiations. 100 Women in one study "tended to equate negotiating with going to
the dentist," while the male respondents were more likely to compare negotiations
92 Id. Section III, Question 1 (attached as Appendix J). 38% of respondents reported "never" and
27.4 % stated "rarely" when asked how often they "try to negotiate or change" form contracts or terms
in making consumer purchases.
93 Id. See also supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text discussing female assertiveness.
94 Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 69, Section III, Question lb (attached as Appendix J).
95 Id.
96 Victoria Pynchon, Women's Attitudes, Skills and Fears About Negotiation, NEGOTIATION LAW
BLOG (June 11, 2010), http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/she-negotiates/womens-attitudes-skills-and-
fears-about-negotiation. This was an unscientific poll of women in business from 2010 published in a
blog, and should be assessed accordingly. However, this at least sheds light on female feelings and
beliefs about negotiations and indicates need for more scientific research exploring these questions.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Leigh Thompson, Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical
Issues, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 515, 518-19 (1990) (noting perception and impression formation in
negotiations).
100 Powell & Ansic, supra note 63, at 606-10.
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with "a wrestling match or winning a ballgame."l01 Lower expectations also may
lead women to accept poor customer service because they do not expect better
treatment or believe that they deserve it. 102
In addition, researchers have found that men in bargaining studies report
greater satisfaction than the women regardless of comparable performance due to
men's greater confidence and expectation of winning.103 This has been true even
in studies involving law and MBA students. For example, researchers reported that
female law students in negotiation exercises at New York University were
consistently more self-deprecating about their performances than male law
students, and reported feeling less competent, especially with respect to working
with numbers and bluffing. 104 This was true even when female students out-
performed the men, and achieved comparable outcomes with the men. 105
Similarly, in a study of the effectiveness of bargaining training programs
involving MBA students, the female students negotiated an average of $1,350 less
than the men, although the women scored slightly higher on a test of tactical
knowledge.1 06 The women knew what tactics to use, but nonetheless set lower
goals and had lower aspirations in the negotiations. This resulted in lower
negotiated outcomes. 107  However, the women significantly improved their
outcomes after self-management training that increased their feelings of self-
efficacy and perceived control. 108
That is not to say that all women lack confidence in negotiations, or fare
worse than men in bargaining. Indeed, many women are more successful than men
in negotiating, and it is unwise to overstate gender differences. 109 Still, the data
101 Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 206 (noting how men said negotiating was "fun" while
women said it was "scary").
102 See Wendy Reiboldt, Factors that Influence a Consumer Complainer's Rating of Service
Received from a Third Party Complaint-Handling Agency-the Los Angeles Department of Consumer
Affairs, 16 J. CONSUMER SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION & COMPLAINING BEHAv. 166, 174 (2001)
(noting that women may rate service higher than men because they have lower expectations regarding
customer service).
103 Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 39, at 653 (reviewing findings from studies on gender in
negotiations); Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 210-11 (reporting studies).
104 Sandra R. Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and Over-Confident Men:
Gender and Sense of Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 271, 291, 294,
300, 303 n.70 (1999).
105 Id. at 278, 294 (explaining study and results, and the Workways program aimed to improve legal
education for and reduce stress for female and minority students).
106 Cynthia Kay Stevens et al., Gender Differences in the Acquisition of Salary Negotiation Skills:
The Role of Goals, Self-Efficacy, and Perceived Control, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 723, 732 (1993)
(reporting findings of gender in a salary negotiation study involving MBA students who had received a
2-stage training program, as well as supplemental training in goal setting or self-management).
107 Id.
10 Id. The author explained how tactics training failed to improve women's outcomes, while self-
management training "may increase women's persistence in the face of employer resistance and may
provide women with a wider array of tactics to use." Id. at 733.
109 Bird Tronvoll, Complainer Characteristics When Exit is Closed, 18 INT'L J. SERVICE INDUSTRY
MGMT. 25, 33-35 (2007) (noting research regarding gender).
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overall tends to indicate that women tend to be more risk-averse and insecure than
men in bargaining. This may hinder women in proactively setting higher goals and
asking for what they want in making purchases and negotiating other contracts.
D. Gender Stereotypes
Conscious and subconscious biases and stereotypes matter in contract
negotiations. They impact how individuals behave, react, and perceive others in
the marketplace. This may burden women to the extent that traditional stereotypes
often cast women as pushovers and poor negotiators in comparison to men. 110
Merchants may offer worse deals to women than men because they perceive them
as less formidable bargainers. 1 1 1 That is why some continue to advise women to
bring men with them to buy a car in order to be "taken seriously." 112
This would seem to suggest that women may benefit from being more
assertive in making purchases and negotiating other contracts. However, this may
harm women's success. Women rightfully worry about being labeled "the Bitch" if
they become the "squeaky wheel" about compensation or if they "grandstand"
about their accomplishments." 13 Studies show that women face a so-called
"backlash effect" from promoting themselves: self-promoting women often are
viewed as less competent, less socially attractive, and less hirable than self-
promoting men. 114 Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized how this
backlash may hinder women in the workplace. 115
This backlash effect may place women in what has been called a "double
bind": women may be perceived as competent but unlikable, or likable but
incompetent. 116 This amounts to a catch-22 for women built on a double standard
for men and women. In one experiment, participants watched videos showing a
finance director-alternatively a man or a woman-choosing between a work crisis
and a family emergency, and then rated the director for competence and likability.
When the female director chose to stay at work, she was rated as competent but
unlikable; when she went home, she was rated as incompetent but likable. The
choices that male directors made did not affect the way they were judged by the
respondents. 117
110 See Laura J. Kray et al., Reversing the Gender Gap in Negotiations: An Exploration of
Stereotype Regeneration, 87 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 386, 387-88 (2002).
111 See supra notes 6, 32-37 and accompanying text (discussing the car sales studies).
112 See Kray et al., supra note 110, at 387.
113 See Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings
in Legal Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27, 69 (2004).
114 Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 629, 630-45
(explaining this effect).
115 See Kray et al., supra note 110, at 387 (noting this in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse and how
stereotypes may burden women in negotiations).
116 Tinsley, supra note 23.
117 Id. at 236.
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Similarly, researchers in another study coached male and female actors to
remain "cooperative and pleasantly assertive" while working with groups who did
not know they were actors.118 Afterwards, group participants described the men as
having "more ability, skill, and intelligence," but described the women behaving in
the same manner as "emotional, bossy, and domineering." The participants
nonetheless denied having any sex biases when asked directly about their
attitudes. 119 Similarly, participants judged female job candidates as significantly
more demanding and less nice than the male candidates although all of them asked
for the same raise in compensation. 120
Such differentials in perceptions for the same behaviors may lead
salespersons to treat men and women differently. Researchers found in a
simulation study that when a manager negotiated for a refund on unused hotel
space, the manager was judged more offensive and less likely to receive a refund
when the role was played by a woman than by a man. 12 1 Nonetheless, studies have
suggested that women may suffer fewer negative consequences for being assertive
in environments where they hold high status. 122
Furthermore, women may not suffer backlash for assertiveness when
advocating on behalf of others because this complies with overall expectations that
women should be communal or nurturing. 123 For example, women lawyers did not
face negative consequences for assertive bargaining in a study asking participants
to rate each other after engaging in mixed-gender negotiations. 124 The lawyers'
assertive behavior was attributed to position rather than gender and was seen as
appropriate because it was on behalf of clients. 125
Stereotypes also may further complicate individuals' use of speaking
opportunities to signal certain characteristics such as strength or intelligence, as
well as how those receiving the communications may assess whether the speaker
possesses valuable characteristics. 126 For example, salespersons may negatively
11s Babcock & Laschever, supra note 85, at 61.
119 Id.; see also W. Reiboldt, Complaint Behavior and Satisfaction with Complaint Outcome: A Look
at Gender Differences, 2002 CONSUMER INTERESTS ANNUAL 1, 2-4 (reporting survey results regarding
complaint handling by an agency in California and noting how male complainants were more likely than
female complainants to indicate satisfaction with the process and feelings that they received necessary
information); Ellen Waldman, Mindfulness, Emotions, and Ethics: The Right Stuff?, 10 NEV. L.J. 513,
523 (2010) (highlighting prejudice at the unconscious level).
120 Tinsley, supra note 23, at 237.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 237-38. Commentators noted this double bind in the 2008 Presidential election to the
extent that the public viewed Hilary Clinton as more competent but unlikeable because she was less
feminine than Sarah Palin, who they viewed as more likeable but less competent. Andrea Kupfer
Schneider et al., Likeability v. Competence: The Impossible Choice Faced by Female Politicians,
Attenuated by Lawyers, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. &POL'Y 363, 363-71, 378 (2010).
123 Tinsley, supra note 23, at 237-38.
124 Schneider, supra note 122, at 373-78.
125 Id. at 378.
126 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103, 107 (2000);
Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 86. But see Robert Geffner & Madeleine M. Gross, Sex-Role
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perceive as "pushy" women's attempts to communicate strength in negotiating
contract terms. 127 This also may lead a female employee to refrain from requesting
a raise or promotion due to concerns that she will appear hostile and lose her
job.128 However, women cannot obtain better contracts and salaries unless they
ask for them. In the end, women often "lose" in terms of likeability and/or getting
what they want either way-if they are or are not assertive. 129
This "stereotype threat" in contract negotiations also may exacerbate the lack
of confidence and lower expectations noted above. 130 Empirical studies show that
simply knowing that feminine traits are linked to poor negotiation skills and
contracting outcomes negatively impacts women's performance in negotiations.
This is true regardless of whether one believes the stereotypes are true. 131 For
example, a woman's subconscious internalization of pushover stereotypes may
hinder her in setting higher expectations, and thus obtaining better outcomes, when
negotiating a purchase price. 132
E. Relational Concerns and Values
Stereotypes dovetail with societal expectations that women should be
altruistic and cooperative, and nurture relationships over economic goals. 133 From
an early age, girls often learn to choose egalitarian allocations, 134 and to express
positive emotion to avoid social costs. 135 Many women also grow up learning to
Behavior and Obedience to Authority: A Field Study, 10 SEx ROLES 973, 973-85 (1984) (hypothesizing
that women would refrain from asserting power, but concluding from their field study of obedience to
traffic directions that females disobeyed directions more frequently and were not "submissive" as
expected).
127 Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward
Agentic Women, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 743, 743-47, 759 (2001).
128 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 126, at 109-10, 114-22, 133-39. A female Latino employee in
a white male-dominated workplace may be more cautious in criticizing institutional policies due to the
stereotype of Latinos being hostile or less loyal than their white male counterparts. Those individuals
considered "outsiders" who believe that others view them negatively due to a stereotype are likely to
lose opportunities in their careers. Id. at 109.
129 Id. (highlighting research indicating that women incur employment costs in the workplace
regardless of whether they enact agentic or communal behaviors).
130 Kray et al., supra note 110, at 388-90 (explaining the "stereotype threat" and studies that confirm
this in various contexts, even controlling for knowledge variables).
131 Id. at 392.
132 Id. at 400-08.
133 Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 39, at 653-58 (highlighting research indicating that women
are more cooperative and relationship-focused in negotiations, but providing that it is unclear whether
this has any effect on negotiation outcomes); Raymond A. Hopkins & Thomas L. Powers, Development
and Test of New Dimensions of Altruistic Buying Behavior, 26 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 185 (2009)
(noting perception of women as more altruistic but also highlighting the array of demographic
differences and dimensions of altruism that should be considered when marketing products).
134 Ernst Fehr et al., The Development of Egalitarianism, Altruism, Spite and Parochialism in
Childhood and Adolescence (University of Innsbruck Working Paper No. 2011-07, 2011) (finding
female preference for egalitarian allocations that weakens with age and noting particularly altruistic
types in men that increase with age).
135 See, e.g., Barkacs & Standifird, supra note 24, at 84-85.
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seek means for signaling generosity in order to gain others' acceptance and
respect. 136 In one survey, female participants reported that a "typical woman" is
more interdependent and concerned with others, while the male respondents more
frequently defined themselves as independent and self-assertive. 137
"In general, men are more concerned with winning and maximizing their
outcomes, whereas women are more concerned with maintaining the
relationship."' 38 Studies suggest that women are more likely than men to view a
conflict in relationship terms, and place relationships and need for acceptance
above winning. 139 Men place greater importance than women on coming out
favorably in negotiations. 140 Women may be "more sensitive and reactive to the
interpersonal aspects of the negotiations than men," and to be more empathetic to
others' situations when engaged in conflict resolution. 141
Although it was an unscientific poll, the businesswomen who responded to
the same 2010 poll noted above confirmed relational inclinations. The
respondents' levels of agreement on a one to ten scale were very high with respect
to relational statements. For example, they assigned an average of 9.2 to "I prefer
cooperative negotiations to competitive ones," 9.4 to "I prefer negotiations that
make my bargaining partner as happy as me[j" and 8.2 to "Relationship is more
important to me than money."1 42 In contrast, the respondents only indicated an
average 3.6 agreement with "I prefer negotiations that end with a deal that gives me
a better bargain than my bargaining partner."1 4 3
Women are said to prioritize "fostering positive relationships" and
"maintaining self-respect" above men's stated concerns with "a comfortable life
and being logical." 1 44  Women do worry about their financial security.145
136 James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow
Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464 (1990) (noting female altruism); Deborah M. Kolb & Gloria G. Coolidge,
Her Place at the Table: A Consideration of Gender Issues in Negotiation, in, NEGOTIATION THEORY
AND PRACTICE 261-64 (Jeffrey Z. Rubin & J. William Breslin eds., 1991) (noting that women would
rather "talk than fight" and consider others' needs in negotiations); David Reinstein & Ferhard Riener,
Reputation and Influence in Charitable Giving: An Experiment (draft on file with author) (discussing
female propensity to signal generosity, especially when a female leader is making a charitable donation).
137 Serge Guimond et al., Social Comparison, Self-Stereotyping, and Gender Differences in Self
Construal, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 221-42 (2006) (examining gender stereotyping
and reporting study results indicating gender differences in self-perceptions that shape behavioral
differences).
138 Thompson, supra note 99, at 520. Again, this is not true for all women or men-but only a
general encapsulation of the data.
139 Barkacs & Standifird, supra note 24, at 83-85.
140 Thompson, supra note 99, at 520.
141 Id. (also emphasizing that the evidence is inconclusive).
142 Pynchon, supra note 96. Again, this poll was not scientific, but it is interesting because it polled
women in business asking them to rate from I to 10 their agreement with a statement that they
considered themselves assertive. The average number was 7.7. Also, it sheds light on average female
perceptions that shape their realities.
143 Id.
144 Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 206-07.
145 See Talya Miron-Shatz, "Am I Going to Be Happy and Financially Stable? ": How American
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However, their financial worries often are secondary or directly linked with their
concerns for partners, parents and children. 146 This relational focus can hinder
women from asking for what they want or deserve, thereby leading them to attain
less financially attractive deals in negotiations. 147
My own e-survey research suggested that although women may be more
aware than men of contract term importance, they nonetheless are less likely to
focus on terms at the time of purchase. As an initial matter, 74.2% of female
versus 65% of male respondents in my survey indicated "somewhat" or "strongly"
disagree that "It is a waste of time to read form terms." 1 48 Similarly, 76.7% female
versus 69.9% male respondents reported that they "somewhat" or "strongly"
disagree that they "Do not see why" they should read form terms, and 81.2%
female versus 75.5% male said "strongly" or "somewhat" agree that "It is very
important to read" purchase terms. 149
When asked about their last purchase of an electronic item, however, 51.5%
of male versus 36.5% of female respondents said that they read the applicable
contract terms before making the purchase. 150 Furthermore, 84.4% of male versus
69.3% of female respondents reported that they considered contract terms
important in deciding whether to get their last credit card. 151 The FINRA study
noted above similarly found that thirty-seven percent of male versus thirty-one
percent of female respondents comparison-shopped for credit cards. 152
FINRA also reported that the women in its study were more likely than the
men to carry a balance, pay only the minimum due, and incur late and over the
limit fees. 153 The FINRA report attributed this to its other finding that women tend
to have lower levels of "financial literacy." 154 However, the FINRA study based
Women Feel When They Think About Financial Security, 4 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 102
(2009), available at http://joumal.sjdm.org/9118/jdm9118.html (reporting results of surveys of women
regarding their financial concerns and how it links with their life satisfaction).
146 Id. at 108-12 (indicating that women often coupled financial concerns with "lack of a support
network" and familial uncertainties).
147 Barkacs & Standifird, supra note 24, at 83-92 (gathering research and theory).
148 Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 69, Section 2, Question 6h (attached as Appendix)
(constituting 71.1% of respondents overall).
149 Id. Section 2, Questions 6i & j (attached as Appendix) (constituting 74.4% and 79.3%
respectively overall).
150 Id. Section 2, Question 1 (attached as Appendix).
151 Id. Section 2, Question 2 (attached as Appendix). Specifically asking "If you read the terms
before you got the credit card, did you consider any terms important in deciding you wanted that card?"
Id.
152 Mottola, supra note 48, at 2.
153 Id. (reporting research, and noting the "bright spot" for women in the FINRA report was that
women were less likely to use their credit cards for cash advances).
154 The researchers reached this conclusion because they found the differences in costly behaviors
only appeared among respondents who had "low levels of financial literacy," and found that 32% of the
women with low financial literacy versus 24% of women with high financial literacy reported engaging
in problematic credit card practices. Id. at 3. Men and women with "high financial literacy" were
equally (both at 24%) likely to engage in problematic credit card behaviors. Id. at 3, 4 (suggesting that
financial literacy training could be particularly beneficial for women in order to address this issue).
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"low levels of financial literacy" merely on the respondents' answers to five
financial literacy questions. Also, the age of respondents may have impacted their
answers to these questions to the extent that older women may have grown up
without access or exposure to financial education. 155
Furthermore, other research suggests that women and men do not differ in
their logical thinking, data organization, and problem-solving skills, but that
women may make more care-based decisions than men due to framing and different
priorities.1 56 Accordingly, although less financial know-how may have contributed
to women's greater propensity for problematic credit card practices in the FINRA
study, this also could have emanated in part from differences in priorities. For
example, the female respondents in my study placed greater importance than men
on factors that some may consider relational or "feminine." When asked to rate the
level of importance of various factors in generally making consumer purchasing
decisions, there was a significant correlation between a respondent's gender and
attribution of importance to "store reputation," "friend or family
recommendations," and "friendly salesperson."1 5 7 Eighty seven percent of the
women versus 77.5% of the men for store reputation, 68.8% of the women versus
56.9% of the men for recommendations, and 72.8% of the women versus 62.4% of
the men for friendliness indicated "very" or "somewhat" important.15 8
The female respondents in my survey also were more likely than the men to
indicate higher importance with respect to relational and altruistic factors when
asked how they would rate various considerations in choosing to purchase a car
from one over another car dealership. In particular, the female respondents
attributed greater importance than the male respondents to "salesperson makes eye
contact," "other dealership sued for discrimination," "dealership donates 5% to
charity," and "dealership is environmentally friendly."l 59 Ninety-two percent of
155 Id. at 2.
156 Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Gender and Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 39 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 145, 177-78 (2012). This was discussed in the context of a study of lawyers facing morally
ambiguous ethical scenarios. Id. at 184.
157 Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 69, Section 1, Question 3 (attached as Appendix)
(specifically asking "When you do "shop around" or compare choices, what leads you to make final
purchasing decisions? Think about the factors below and indicate how important each of the factors
generally is to you in deciding what to buy[]"; listed factors also included but generating no significant
gender differences included relationship to seller, availability, brand, financing, contract terms, "want
it," consumer reviews, "gut feeling," and price).
158 Id. The Kendall's tau values provided in the Appendix indicate the strength of correlation. For
example with respect to recommendations, female respondents were therefore significantly more likely
to find these recommendations important per a Kendall's tau of -. 121 between gender (coded I for male
and 2 for female) and an indication of importance (coded I to 4 for "very important," "somewhat
important," "minor importance," and "not important").
159 Schmitz, Consumer Survey, supra note 69, Section 1, Question 4 (attached as Appendix)
(specifically asking: "You have decided that you would like to purchase a particular model of new car
with certain options. Two car dealerships in your area list this new car with the options you want at the
same price. At one of the dealerships, you learn or experience the following, listed below. How
important would each of these be in leading you toward purchasing at this dealership instead of the
other?"; listing 17 other factors related to the salesperson and dealership practices such as friendliness,
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the women versus 80.6% of the men with respect to eye contact, 73.8% of the
women versus 48.5% of the men regarding discrimination, 67% of the women
versus 41.7% of the men with respect to donation to charity, and 71.3% of the
women versus 57.3% of men with respect to environmental friendliness reported
"very" or "somewhat" important. 160
Relational concerns often are laudable, and it may be that a relationally
beneficial but less economically advantageous contract brings more satisfaction in
the long run. However, some women may feel constrained in a "psychological
straitjacket" that hinders them from negotiating, or seeking what they really want or
need in contracting contexts. 161 Because women tend to view situations within
relationships, they may be less likely than men to feel entitled to ask for better
deals or recognize opportunities for bargaining. Furthermore, this may dovetail
with stereotypes and societal expectations so that "[e]ven if a woman feels entitled,
she may stop herself from acting in what is typically defined as a masculine
behavior."1 62 Some women also may fear that asserting themselves in negotiations
will signal rudeness or harm positive relationship-building. 163
Accordingly, relational priorities, stereotype threat, and lower expectations
work together to contribute to women's propensity to be less competitive than men
in negotiations. Male participants in a tournament study measuring
competitiveness were more aggressive and thus attained greater outcomes than the
female participants. 164 Similarly, male participants in another negotiation study
sought to further their own interests about four times more often than the female
participants. 165 The men in the study also were much more likely than the women
to even recognize opportunities to negotiate. 166
knowledge, long-time relationship with the company, etc. that did not indicate significant correlation
with gender).
160 See id.
161 See Rudman, supra note 114, at 629-631 (explaining socialized behavioral differences between
men and women and expectations that women should be more "community oriented" and less proactive
in protecting their own economic interests); Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk
Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 Mich. J. Gender & L. 299, 302 (1999) (discussing gender in
negotiations); Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Ask For It (2008) (suggesting strategies to help women
better evaluate their worth and assert themselves in ways that comport with their personalities).
162 Barkacs & Standifird, supra note 24, at 86 (discussing female expectations regarding "niceness"
and gender differences in taking advantage of opportunities to negotiate). Women also may refrain from
using complaint processes because the processes do not allow them to adequately voice their feelings.
See Nancy M. Henley & Marianne LaFrance, Gender as Culture: Diference and Dominance in
Nonverbal Behavior, in NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR: PERSPECTIVES, APPLICATIONS, INTERCULTURAL
INSIGHTS 351-71 (Aron Wolfgang ed., 1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution:
Parties, Lawyers and Dispute Resolvers: What Difference Does "Gender Difference" Make?, 18 No. 3
Disp. RESOL. MAG. 4, 6-7 (2012).
163 Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 206-07.
i64 Id. at 205-08 (citing studies).
165 Babcock & Laschever, supra note 85, at 4, 41.
166 Id. (noting how women were 45% more likely to score low on a rating scale assessing whether
people saw their situations as open to change via negotiations).
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That said, research also indicates that some women may be better negotiators
than men due to their more cooperative and relational approaches. 16 7 This is
especially true when women are acting for the benefit of others. For example, there
is some evidence that women may be more successful than men when negotiating
salary and other benefits on behalf of others. 168 Some studies also indicate that
women often show superior problem-solving, advocacy and leadership skills when
acting in a representative capacity, rather than negotiation for one's own benefit.1 69
In addition, one researcher found that female lawyers may fare better when
representing clients in mediation because they are more comfortable engaging in
collaborative problem-solving than raw adversarial processes. 170
Again, generalizations are not true for all women or men, and individual
differences remain paramount. The evidence is mixed and not all women fit any
particular negotiation profile. Indeed, bargaining behaviors and outcomes are
intricately related to situations, external cues, background, and overall context. 17 1
Nonetheless, gender, framing, and emotion impact negotiations. 172 The evidence
suggests that stereotypes and bargaining dynamics raise costs and risks for women
in negotiations. 173 This has led negotiation educators to develop programs to assist
women in overcoming communications barriers they face in the workplace and
marketplace. 174
II. LIMITED CONSIDERATION OF GENDER IN CONTRACT AND CONSUMER LAW
One may assume that contract law and discrimination legislation would
address gender discrimination and companies' taking improper advantage of gender
stereotypes and behavioral propensities. In reality, however, "the most common
manner in which contract doctrine deals with the problem of discrimination is by
not dealing with it at all[,]" and consumer laws generally do little to preclude
167 See M. AFZALUR RAHIM, MANAGING CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS 133-40 (3rd ed. 2001)
(highlighting how the evidence is mixed at best).
168 Lu-in Wang, Negotiating the Situation: The Reasonable Person in Context, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV 1285 (2010) (discussing women's social costs in negotiations and importance of gender in
understanding contract behavior).
169 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 162, at 4-8 (gathering citations to research and conclusions).
170 Id. at 4-9.
171 Dorothy E. Weaver & Susan W. Coleman, The Literature on Women and Negotiation: A Recap,
18 No. 3 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 3-4 (2011) (discussing how gender may matter in negotiations but is
highly dependent on situation and context); Menkel-Meadow supra note 162, at 6-10 (emphasizing how
case-type and legal standards impact gender-differential behaviors).
172 See Jerry Plymire, Complaints as Opportunities, 5 J. SERVICES MARKETING 61, 61-62 (1991)
(explaining emotional components of complaint discussions).
173 Carbado & Gulati, supra note 126, at 110-11, 136-37, 141-42 (explaining how employers may
exploit outsider vulnerabilities).
174 Nina Schichor, Mitigating Gender Schemas: The Women, Leadership & Equality Program at the
University of Maryland School of Law, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 563, 564-70 (2009) (describing
and discussing a law school program aimed at assisting women in workplace negotiations through
theoretical, experiential, and applied components).
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discrimination in private consumer contracting.1 75 Constitutional and statutory
protections mainly target overt discrimination, while classical contract doctrine
glosses over context, including gender considerations. Instead, contract law
influenced by law and economics theory assumes that individuals with perfect
information make rational contracting choices that serve economic efficiency
goals.176  Furthermore, the limited discrimination laws targeting consumer
contracting generally focus on lending and create high hurdles to proving claims-
especially with respect to disparate impact or other more subtle bias.
A. Classical Contract Assumption of Gender Neutrality
Classical contract law aims to preserve freedom of contract and ensure
promise enforcement in a presumably competitive market.177 Furthermore, it is
founded on objective theory with respect to buyers, sellers, and judges. 178 It
presumes that purchasers, sellers and decision-makers are rational actors with
requisite information and bargaining power to make well-informed decisions. 179
These neutral actors are somehow immune from perceptions and biases, and are
therefore blind to sexism, stereotypes, and behavioral propensities that defy what
may appear objectively "rational" based on simple cost/benefit analyses. 180
This classical law also seeks to avoid what may appear as paternalism or
improper interference with freedom of contract or family privacy. 181 Instead,
classical theory dissuades courts from expending resources to consider contextual
factors such as gender when enforcing private agreements. This is especially true
with respect to business-to-consumer, or "B2C," sales contracts that businesses
present to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Courts treat these forms like any other contract although they are generally
non-negotiable and easily bypass consumer attention under the shroud of confusing
internet links or useless paper in bill stuffers. Furthermore, the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") Article 2 governing sale of goods does not directly
limit enforcement of form contracts.1 82 Instead, the UCC Article 2 is built on
175 Keren, supra note 7, at 140. See also Luis Diaz-Serrano & Josep M. Raya, Is there
Discriminatory Mortgage Pricing Against Immigrants in the Spanish Lending Market?, (IZA,
Discussion Paper No. 5578 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1790689 (noting lack of anti-
discrimination laws regarding housing and lending markets in Europe and discussing study finding
significant discrimination in housing and lending markets in Spain).
176 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REv. 73,
97 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitz, Safety Net].
177 See Threedy, supra note 8, at 1260 (noting this is fundamental).
178 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 208-13 (2006)
(discussing objective theory of classical legal thought).
179 DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 27, at 1218-21 (discussing classical conceptions of contract).
180 Id. at 198.
181 See Threedy, supra note 8, at 1252-55, 1260-62 (arguing that what she calls "the game" of
contract law skirts gender issues).
182 See Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 176, at 73-97 (noting how the UCC's seemingly broad
unconscionability provision has failed to promote courts' active consideration of context).
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classical assumptions and therefore limits regulation of form contracts to general
contract defenses such as unconscionability.183
This classical law has joined forces with law and economics theory over the
years to enhance classical law's pro-enforcement aim and objective vision of
buyers and sellers. Law and economics augments the normative focus on
promoting market efficiency, and enhances warnings against judicial consideration
of context. Economists emphasize how courts' strict enforcement of contracts
without deep contextual consideration is necessary for optimal distribution of
resources through market competition. 184
Law and economics theorists argue that legislative regulation of contract
terms or other intrusion on freedom of contract produces negative consequences not
only for companies, but also for consumers and the overall economy. 185 This is
because companies pass on costs of regulations and contract litigation to consumers
through increased prices and decreased quality of goods and services. Furthermore,
courts' unpredictable enforcement of contracts may cause merchants to avoid
transactions with those likely to challenge adhesion contracts. 186 Some scholars
add that strict enforcement of form contracts benefits all consumers regardless of
the contracts' adhesive nature because standardization lowers transaction costs and
fosters production overall. 187
An example of how classical and economic theories influence contract law
can be seen in opinions like Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 188 In that case, the court
emphasized the efficiency of form contracting in enforcing an arbitration provision
buried in the packaging that came with the computer the Hills had purchased over
the phone. The court concluded that the Hills assented to the provision by not
returning the computer within thirty days as permitted by the approve-or-return
proviso in other packaged terms. 189 The court gave little thought to the Hills' lack
183 See, e.g., Threedy, supra note 8, at 1262-63 (discussing perspectives on cases such as Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. in which courts consider gender in applying unconscionability).
184 See KENNEDY, supra note 178, at 212-13 (noting the efficiency basis for the objective versus
subjective approaches).
15 See Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 176, at 95 n.181 (scholars fail to "dig[] down as deep as one
might into the moral question: why, or under what circumstances, should 'consent' justify state
enforcement of agreements?"); see also Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal,
18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293 (1975) (discussing strict enforcement under classical contract doctrine); Peter
Huber, Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis ofModern Tort, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2263, 2268-69 (1989)
(highlighting how the operation of classical contract law can result in harsh outcomes).
186 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002).
187 See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract,
58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1403-04, 1433-51 (2009) (arguing that consumers prefer standardized contracts
over spending time negotiating individualized terms, and that standardization allows for innovation
through segmented consideration).
188 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing a form computer
purchase contract requiring arbitration). But see Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-
75 (App. Div. 1998) (enforcing the identical Gateway arbitration clause, but vacating the portion of the
clause requiring arbitration before a tribunal that may be excessively costly).
189 See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150-51. The Court also rejected the Hills' claims that the arbitration
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of bargaining power, psychological barriers to sending goods back, shipping costs,
and other burdens of product returns. 190 It indicated no sympathy for consumers
who fail to read and take action with respect to form terms ex ante. 191
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in Hayes v. The Oakridge Home refused
to consider age and gender in strictly enforcing an arbitration clause in a form
contract between a nursing home and its 95-year-old female resident. 192 The court
had a nearly eagle-eyed focus on the fact that the resident who passed away before
trial had signed the written arbitration contract. The court gave little credence to
her estate representative's claims that the contract eliminated her right to trial and
punitive damages without her true consent. 193 Instead, the court warned that
judicial consideration of such contextual concerns might violate constitutional
rights to private contract. 194
Many courts routinely apply this efficiency-focused and formulaic analysis to
enforce consumer contracts despite their non-negotiable nature. 195 They often
justify this strict enforcement as proper under classical contract principles and
necessary to the vitality of an efficient market economy. 196 Courts borrow from
economists in advancing form contracts as means for fostering convenience and
cost savings that corporations may pass on to consumers. 197 Many also subscribe
to the notion that consumers remain free to reject form contracts and bear
responsibility for their failures to shop for or negotiate their contracts. 198
Although not all courts strictly subscribe to classical and economic analysis,
many courts do. Focus on classical contract with a law and economics bent
produces a market and efficiency focus that dissuades courts from considering
clause was invalid regardless of its nonconsensual nature because it precluded class relief, curtailed their
right to recover attorney fees under the Magnusson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), and required them
to arbitrate their claims in a potentially expensive forum.
190 Id.
191 See id; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that an employee assented to an arbitration clause an employer imposed after hiring the
employee because the employee could opt out within thirty days). Companies now go further by
requiring consumers to revisit companies' "terms and conditions" on their websites to learn of contract
changes and additions that consumers are deemed to accept by continuing to use a company's products
or services. See, e.g., Meetup Terms of Service Agreement, MEETUP.COM, http://www.meetup.com/
terms (last visited May 23, 2011).
192 Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 409-16 (Ohio 2009).
193 Id. at 412-16.
194 Id. at 412-14 (highlighting United States and state constitutional provisions requiring courts to
defend the right to private contract).
195 See generally MORTON J. HORWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780, at 1860-
73 (1st ed. 1977).
196 See id. at 161.
197 See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 186, at 440-41.
198 See id. at 437, 441; see also Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-50 (finding assent to a form arbitration
clause). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1381, 1382-86 (1996) (critiquing the courts
for "drifting away from, or perhaps abandoning altogether, society's traditional notions of meaningful
consent").
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contextual factors such as parties' gender and race. "The tendency to downplay the
harm of discriminatory contractual behavior is a common response to the problem,
especially among economists and scholars who can be described as 'market-
oriented."' 1 99 "Free market" supporters propose that the market will cure any
discriminatory contracting because sellers will remain blind to biases as they
compete for customers, and this will eventually squeeze any discriminatory
businesses out of the market. 200 This again assumes that sellers and buyers are
economically rational actors.
Again, the resulting contract law seeks mainly to promote promise
enforcement, and places special trust in the market to weed out any discrimination.
Courts remain reluctant to regulate contracts or consider context when enforcing
contract terms. This takes away courts' cognizance of biases, stereotypes, societal
norms, and behavioral propensities that may affect contracts in the real world.
B. Scarce Statutory Attention to Gender Discrimination in Consumer Contracting
The United States Constitution coupled with federal and state statutes provide
some protection for women from discriminatory contracting practices. The law is
not entirely blind to gender discrimination. However, the existing laws are narrow
and difficult to use, especially when it comes to protecting women from more
subtle discriminatory contracting practices. Furthermore, seemingly neutral laws
may disproportionately burden women, or otherwise permit companies to
consciously and/or subconsciously treat women differently than men to women's
detriment in the marketplace.
As an initial matter, constitutional due process and equality provisions only
apply when state action is involved. The U.S. Constitution therefore was important
in quashing state laws that deemed married women incompetent to make
contracts.201 It nonetheless was not until 1981 that the United States Supreme
Court finally put an end to the last vestiges of such discrimination, by holding that
laws allowing a husband to sell or encumber marital property without a wife's
consent were unconstitutional. 202  Meanwhile, constitutional equal protection
constraints have become important in quashing quotas or other state action that
199 Keren, supra note 7, at 155.
200 Id. at 156-58 (discussing market-oriented hostility to regulating contracts).
201 John A. Ward, Husband and Wife-Contracts-Married Woman Not Liable on Mercantile or
Trading Contract Unless Disability of Coverture Removed-Wyner v. Express Publishing Co., 288 . W.2d
583 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1956, Error Ref'd N.R.E), 34 TEX. L. REV. 1094, 1094-96 (1956)
(highlighting courts' applications of covertures statutes directing that a married woman cannot enter
binding contracts made for purchase or sale of goods and services); Edgar H. Keltner, Jr., Suggested
Legislative Action to Liberalize the Contractual and Property Rights of Texas Married Women, 25 TEX.
L. REV. 657, 658-66 (1947) (critiquing Texas laws' refusal at that time to grant married women the right
to enter into binding contracts).
202 Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (ruling that the Louisiana statute was
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because it gave authority to the husband as "head and
master" to alienate marital property without spousal consent).
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provides racial minorities or women with special rights. 203 Such action will only
survive constitutional scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest. 204
Meanwhile, state and federal anti-discrimination statutes usually focus on
employment, housing, and lending. Claimants under the Civil Rights Act and other
discrimination laws generally must show disparate treatment or disparate impact
based on their race, gender or other such suspect classification. 205 Such claims
have had the most success with respect to employment discrimination, especially
with the benefit of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's focus
on addressing employers' discriminatory practices. 206 Recently, the federal
government also prevented erosion of the Civil Rights Act and other anti-
discrimination acts by clarifying that the 180-day window for filing a
discriminatory compensation claim begins each time compensation is paid pursuant
to an unlawful decision or practice. 207
Still, gender salary gaps remain. 208 Furthermore, the proposed Fair Pay Act
failed in June 2012, to the dismay of many women's groups and cheers of those
who claimed the bill would have encouraged frivolous litigation. The Act would
have shifted the burden to require employers to justify differences in pay based on
qualifications, education and other objective criteria unrelated to gender.209 It also
203 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (finding Richmond's requirement that its prime contractors
subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to minority-owned businesses was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to rectify past discrimination in the construction
industry).
204 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (upholding a law school's use of race in
admissions decisions because it was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in obtaining a
diverse student body); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding a
Washington state minimum wage law for women due to documented evidence) ("[E]xploitation of a
class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively
defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being, but
casts a direct burden for their support upon the community.").
205 See, e.g., Arkansas Fair Housing Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-201-16-123-210 (2011);
Florida Fair Housing Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 760.20-760.37 (2011); South Carolina Fair Housing Law, S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-21-10 to 31-21-150 (2010); Texas Fair Housing Act, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§
301.001-301.005 (2011); Utah Fair Housing Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-21-1 to 57-21-14 (2011).
206 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sex-Based Discrimination,
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//laws/types/sex.cfmn?renderforprint-l (last visited June 29, 2012) (defining the
scope of discrimination the commission covers).
207 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2012). It was passed to
supersede the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618
(2007), which held that 180 day window to bring a pay discrimination claim begins on the day when the
employer set the discriminatory pay. Id. The Act restores the EEOC's prior position linking the filing
window to the receipt of any paycheck where the pay was discriminatory. Notice Concerning the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/epa ledbetter.cfm (last
visited June 25, 2012).
208 See supra note 85 (citing references regarding the salary gap).
209 See Janet Hook, US Senate Republicans Block Women's Wage Bill, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Jun. 5,
2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO- 2 0120605-710409.html (last visited July 31, 2012); Jennifer
Steinhauer, Senate Republicans Again Block Pay Equity Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 5, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/us/politics/senate-republicans-block-pay-equity-bill.html.
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would have prohibited employers from retaliating against employees who discuss
wages in response to a complaint or investigation, and would have subjected
employers to compensatory or punitive damages for statutory violations. 2 10
In the lending context, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits
creditors from discriminating against any applicant with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction on the basis of sex or marital status.2 11 Furthermore, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma have state statutes prohibiting discrimination in
consumer credit transactions on the basis of sex or marital status. 2 12 New Mexico,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and the District of Columbia also
have state statutes prohibiting gender discrimination in the insurance context.2 13
Kentucky has a general statute that prohibits gender discrimination in financial
practices.2 14
A handful of states also have broader anti-discrimination laws with respect to
contracting. 2 15 California is especially proactive. 2 16 Along with barring gender
discrimination in credit contracts, the California Civil Code also prohibits
discrimination in granting franchises 2 17 and discriminatory provisions in letters of
credit or other documents. 2 18 In 1996, California also became the first state to
specifically prohibit gender discrimination in prices charged for services of similar
or like kind. 219 The law aimed to address well-documented discrimination against
210 See Hook, supra note 210 (noting how the law would have exempted the federal government
from punitive damages). See also How the Paycheck Fairness Act Will Strengthen the Equal Pay Act,NWLC (May 2012), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/broadpaycheckfairnessfactsheet.pdf
(providing facts about the proposal before its failure in the Senate).
211 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2011).
212 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(4) (2011) (Arkansas) (consumers have the "right to engage in
credit and other contractual transactions without discrimination."); Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of
1971, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747-1748.95 (2010) (California); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-210 (Colorado);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-65 (2011) (Connecticut); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6-1 and 2 (2011) (Georgia);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 408.550 (Missouri); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598B.010-598B.180 (2011) (Nevada); N.Y.
CLS ExEc. § 296-a (2011) (New York); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-17 (2011) (North Dakota); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (2011) (Ohio); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 1-109 (2011) (Oklahoma).
213 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-13 (2011) (New Mexico); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4 (2011)(New Hampshire); N.J. STAT. § 17:29B-4 (2011) (New Jersey); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-1210 (2010)(South Carolina); D.C. CODE § 31-1603 (District of Columbia).
214 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.370 (2011).
215 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (2011) (New Mexico); Human Rights Law, N.Y. CLS
ExEc. §§ 290-301 (2011) (New York); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-1 (2011) (North Carolina); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2011) (North Dakota); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (2011) (Ohio); 43 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 955 (2011) (Pennsylvania); Virginia Human Rights Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3900-
2.2.3902 (2011) (Virginia).
216 See generally CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-53 (2011); Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1747-1748.95 (2010); Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784(1971); California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12900-12906 (2011).
217 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.8 (2011).
218 Id. § 16721.5 (2011).
219 Civil Rights, supra note 38, at 1839-44 (discussing the Gender Tax Repeal Act); CAL. CIV. CODE§ 51.6 (2011). This augmented the Unruh Civil Rights Act, all persons, no matter their sex, marital
status, or sexual orientation, must have full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges,
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women in pricing for haircuts, laundry, dry cleaning and alterations that cost
California women approximately $15 billion annually. 220 Nonetheless, the law
exempts price differentials in the sale of goods and has been criticized for allowing
businesses to rather easily justify price differentials for services based on "time,
difficulty, or cost[.]"221
Laws like ECOA and state discrimination statutes are most helpful in
attacking disparate treatment or other overt and well-documented discrimination.
For example, a plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss where she proves
disparate treatment based on evidence that a creditor used gender-based epithets in
threatening to increase the amount owed on a debt.222 However, even disparate
treatment claimants face difficulties in finding and obtaining company memos or
other evidence to prove their allegations. 22 3
Disparate impact cases are even more difficult to prove. Claimants bear a
tough burden in (1) establishing that the defendant employed a specific policy or
practice in order to discriminate, and (2) demonstrating with statistical data that the
policy or practice had a demonstrable adverse effect on the claimants. 224
Furthermore, such claims are particularly difficult to prove in lending and other
consumer contract cases because defendants may easily hide misuse of gender
biases or stereotypes in determining rates and prices under the guise of "business
justifications." 22 5 It is nearly impossible for consumers to rebut "discretionary
and services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (2011).
220 Civil Rights, supra note 38, at 1840 (also noting that this was costing each woman about $1,351
per year). This law also requires businesses to disclose in writing the pricing for standard services, and
provide customers with a complete price list upon request. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.6 (2011).
221 Civil Rights, supra note 38, at 1840. The author critiqued the narrow scope of the law and
proposing a ban on use of such "business necessity" excuses for price discrimination. Id. at 1844.
222 Sharp v. Chartwell Financial Services Ltd., 2000 WL 283095, at *2, *2-5 (N.D. El. Mar. 6,
2000) (finding plaintiffs survived the creditor's motion to dismiss on their ECOA and FDCPA claims
where they had specific evidence of harassing threats with gender-based and racial epithets).
223 In addition, women may be able to use the FDPA to recover against debt collectors who harass
them with threats against their children or negative comments about their marriages and capacity to raise
children. See, e.g., Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 867-75 (awarding plaintiff
damages under the FDCPA where a collector told her that she "shouldn't have children" due to her
hospital debt); FTC v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 162-64 (affirming injunction and fines
against a company that told female debtors that their children would see them "being taken away in
handcuffs," and "be bringing their mommy care packages in prison."); Black v. Aegis Consumer
Funding Group, Inc., 2001 WL 228062, at *2, *2-9 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (awarding damages under the
FDCPA where the collectors told a mother that they would take her "kids' clothing," and hounded her
about whether her marriage was the reason she was not paying her debts).
224 See Carle, supra note 14, at 256-57, 297-98 (It is "very rare for plaintiffs [in disparate impact
cases] other than highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice,
to prevail under Title VII [in the employment context.]").
225 Musudi v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2008 WL 2944643, at *2, *2-5 (E.D. N.Y. 2008) (dismissing
an ECOA claim for failure to meet this burden of proof, and dismissing the FDCPA claim because the
defendant was a creditor and not a collector). Borrowers also have launched "reverse redlining" cases
against lenders that target racial minority communities for overpriced loans, but these actions are
difficult for plaintiffs and their attorneys to recognize, let alone prove and bring to successful fruition.
See Andrew Lichtenstein, United We Stand, Disparate We Fall: Putting Individual Victims of Reverse
Redlining in Touch with Their Class, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1339 (2010) (discussing reverse redlining
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pricing" as justification for subtle discrimination. 226  This allows subtle
discrimination to persist, especially with respect to gender due to lack of available
data documenting historical and continuing structural gender biases. 2 27
At the same time, general consumer lending protections like the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA") and the Real Estate Settlement Act ("RESPA") have been
criticized for disproportionately burdening women by overloading consumers with
disclosures. 228 The TILA requires lenders to disclose key information such as fees
and interest rates, and regulation Z implementing the TILA mandates that
disclosures be "clear and conspicuous." RESPA provides similar disclosure-
focused rules. Although such disclosures may help consumers in making informed
borrowing decisions, some commentators argue that women tend to be less
financially experienced and confident than men in making lending decisions, and
therefore disclosures may further cloud women's borrowing decisions. 229
Nonetheless, this critique may be unwarranted and most consumer advocates
support disclosure rules. Furthermore, other research indicates that women are just
as financially savvy as men, and may make better borrowing decisions than men by
avoiding overly risky behavior. 230 Still, the impact of disclosures on women is at
least worth considering in light of additional research suggesting that lenders have
disproportionately preyed on female consumers. 231
Furthermore, as noted above, some also have criticized recent credit card
regulations for disproportionately harming women in the marketplace. The new
Federal Reserve rules precluding credit card issuers from considering household
income are beneficial to the extent that they restrict consumers from racking up
debt they cannot repay. However, these new rules may be problematic for stay-at-
claims); Pouya Bavafa, The Intentional Targeting Test: A Necessary Alternative to the Disparate
Treatment and Disparate Impact Analyses in Property Rentals Discrimination, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 491, 496 (2010) (discussing reverse redlining in housing rentals and "substantial difficulty
establishing discrimination under traditional civil rights jurisprudence.").
226 See Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination,
and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 375 (2010) (discussing difficulty of proving
discrimination in mortgage cases, and the role of "discretionary pricing").
227 Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 Mo. L. REv. 443 (2010) (highlighting
persistence of discrimination at the "subtle level" and difficulty of proving discrimination claims under
Title VII, especially with respect to gender); Deval L. Patrick et al., The Role of Credit Scoring in Fair
Lending Law-Panacea or Placebo?, 18 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 369, 386-89 (1999) (noting how the
difficulty of proving lending discrimination has left it to the U.S. Department of Justice to enforce fair
lending laws, and that the Department has had to focus most of its limited resources on disparate
treatment cases with respect to race).
228 See Sarto, supra note 4, at 349-52 (proposing need for gender considerations in regulating
lending).
229 Id. at 350 (noting this critique).
230 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (noting studies indicating how women may make
better decisions due to risk avoidance).
231 See Sarto, supra note 4, at 350; see also Mottola, supra note 48, at 1 (stating research indicating
that "women consistently score lower than men on measures of financial literacy"); supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text (discussing research indicating that brokers disproportionately steer women
toward subprime lending products despite their equal capacity to pay).
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home moms and women under the thumbs of abusive partners by hindering them
from building their own credit scores. The regulations allow consideration of
jointly owned accounts, but many women do not have joint ownership of their
partners' accounts. This may effectively preclude these women from establishing
independent credit, which is necessary for not only obtaining credit cards and other
loans, but also renting cars, making online or in-flight purchases, and accessing
housing and beneficial insurance rates. 232
Moreover, laws do not address gender discrimination in pricing of goods and
have been largely ineffective in curing disparate impact and more subtle misuse of
stereotypes as proxies for justifying contract discrimination. 233 Understandably,
overt discrimination is easier to target than subtle practices that are easy to hide
under the guise of business judgment. Furthermore, consumer protection and
contract laws must be careful not to indoctrinate gender stereotypes and there are
laudable constitutional and statutory constraints on discriminatory contracting
practices. Current laws, however, set high burdens for individuals asserting gender
discrimination claims, and are largely ineffective in protecting women from more
subtle discriminatory contracting practices. Furthermore, policymakers rarely
consider gender-related contracting data or explore how seemingly neutral laws
may disproportionately burden women.
This has led some commentators to advocate direct gender consideration in
financial reforms. 234 With respect to lending regulations, one commentator has
proposed proactive regulations to account for women's disproportionate burdens
from foreclosure, especially when they have families to support on no or low
income. 235 Commentators also have proposed an independent mechanism for
reviewing and approving standard form contracts, 236 while other countries impose
stiff criminal penalties on companies that breach fairness standards. 2 37
Nonetheless, such outright regulation of private contracts may overly intrude
in contractual freedom without truly addressing the real hurdles women face in
contracting. Instead, a better approach may be to more seriously consider gender as
232 Merzer, supra note 16 (discussing the impact of the new credit card regulations).
233 Civil Rights, supra note 38, at 1843 (highlighting lack of laws addressing gender discrimination
and specific exemptions for sale of goods based on market efficiency interests and arguments).
234 See Sarto, supra note 4 (discussing how reforms could address gender issues).
235 Id. at 348-51 (highlighting need for gender considerations in lending reforms).
236 Shmuel 1. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts
and Conventional Contract Law, 68 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 750-55, 800-04 (2007) (advancing
central clearing house for contracts); see Robert A. Hillman, On-line Consumer Standard-Form
Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion ofLegal Implications, Cornell Law School Res. Paper
Series No. 05-12, 1-30 (2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-686817 (proposing requirements
that e-businesses make terms available on their websites and follow substantive mandatory rules for
forum selection and choice of law provisions).
237 See Rebecca de Lorenzo, On Good Terms, 153 SOLICITORS J. 16, 16 (2009) (discussing the
U.K.'s Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997, and
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, and how they may impose criminal
sanctions for unfair consumer contracts).
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an important component of context when analyzing and enforcing contracts.
Contract theory provides means for such consideration, as discussed below.
Furthermore, policymakers can further promote genuine contractual consent by
augmenting financial education and contract training programs. 238
III. CONTEXTUAL RECOGNITION OF GENDER REALITIES
Formalistic and classical contract approaches have dominated contract law
and literature, but have not had free reign. Relational and behavioral theorists have
highlighted context and relational dynamics in questioning formalistic notions of
consent, especially with respect to long-term and intra-industry transactions. 239
These theorists highlight how the objective focus of classical contract principles
may ignore particularities of contracting parties who transact not in an ideal and
rational universe, but in the real world wrought with life's messiness. 24 0 In
addition, critical legal theory has added emphasis on how classical contract law
may perpetuate power imbalances. Together, relational and critical theories,
therefore, may improve contract law and commentary by shedding light on factors,
such as gender, that are salient in understanding and applying law in action.
A. Behavioral and Relational Theories
Efficiency has remained at the core of the UCC Article 2 sales law.
However, its architect, Professor Karl Llewellyn, first envisioned the law as
recognizing a more contextual view of contracting parties who act within groups.
Llewellyn's contractual actor was a contextual being to the extent it operates within
the particular transaction and group. 24 1  This is distinct from the narrow
"reasonable person" of classical theory. This person is socially cognizant and
textured by continually changing realities.
Relational and behavioral theorists have echoed and enhanced these
considerations of context in contract law. Relational theorists recognize that
transactions are not purely discrete, but instead involve a web of interactions
238 See, e.g., Babcock & Laschever, supra note 85 (providing a manual to assist women in
identifying pitfalls in their negotiations and finding ways to better assert themselves); Barkacs &
Standifird supra note 24, at 90-91 (highlighting how confronting gender stereotypes can improve
women's negotiation performance).
239 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001) (exploring the use
of a private legal system in the cotton industry); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. I (1963) (studying contextual relations in commercial
exchanges); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment ofLong-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978) (discussing the relational
nature of long-term contracts).
240 Amy J. Schmitz, Confronting ADR Agreements' Contract/No-Contract Conundrum with Good
Faith, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 55,69 (2006) (highlighting the "messiness" of real world contracting).
241 DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 27, at 199-200 (discussing a broader notion of the contractual
self).
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among real people with varying interests, understandings, and agendas.2 42 These
theorists challenge contract law to consider negotiation motives and to protect
relationships, rather than simply focus on enforcement of rights. 243
Consideration of context also resonates in my "contracting culture" work
noted above. 244 This analysis highlights how even consideration of particular
attributes, such as gender, is not sufficient. Instead, contracting behaviors and
outcomes depend on complex webs of social, behavioral, economic, and other
factors as they interrelate within different communities and institutions. 24 5 With
respect to enforcement of arbitration agreements, for example, I proposed a
continuum analysis of contracting cultures ranging from "intra-communal" to
"extra-communal" based on parties' relations, understandings, and values. I placed
B2C contracts at the extra-communal end of this continuum due to consumers' lack
of connections or shared interests with companies that employ these adhesive
contracts. 246
The research by cognitive theorists also has illuminated individuals'
erroneous assessments of contract terms. 247 They highlight how individuals are
prone to ignore contract terms ex ante due to overconfidence that nothing will go
wrong with their purchases. 248  Furthermore, short attention spans hinder
individuals from reading long or complex terms, and contracting inertia causes
individuals to accept preprinted terms even if they defy legal defaults.249
Individuals also may fail to negotiate for fear that they will "rock the boat."250
242 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AMER. Soc.
REV. 55 (1963) (studying contextual relations in commercial exchanges); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) (discussing the relational nature of long-term contracts).
243 See Macneil, supra note 242, at 879, 891-901 (discussing suitability of dispute resolution
mechanisms to protect ongoing relations).
244 See Schmitz, Contracting Culture, supra note 26 (discussing "contracting culture" analysis).
245 Id.
246 Id. See also Deborah Kolb, Too Bad for the Women or Does it Have to Be? Gender and
Negotiation Research over the Past Twenty-Five Years, 25 NEGOT. J. 515, 520-25 (2009) (proposing
how some theorists view gender within a system of social and cultural practices as they relate to
different institutions).
247 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 307-22 (2006) (discussing cognitive biases generally); Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203 (2003) (discussing law-and-economics' assumptions regarding consumer rationality and proposing
that "buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers," and, therefore, market
forces often will lead to inefficient terms in sellers' form contracts).
248 Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV.
117, 122-25 (explaining behavioral law and economics basics); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1607-09, 1627 (1998) (noting individuals' "tunnel vision" is skewed by their
biases). But see RICHARD A POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 264-65 (2001) (critiquing
behavioral law-and-economic assumptions as merely a psychological and sociological account of human
behavior that confuses explanation and prediction and lacks "theoretical ambition").
249 See Korobkin, supra note 248, at 1626-27 (advancing the "inertia theory" that parties prefer
default contract provisions).
250 See id. (explaining how negotiators may avoid potentially deal-breaking departures from status
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Individuals' rationality is therefore "bounded" to the extent they do not properly
assess contracts to protect their long-term economic interests. 25 1
Consumers may fall prey to psychological and behavioral patterns such as
confirmation bias, which leads us to seek information to justify or confirm our
initial inclinations although they may be false. 252 Similarly, consumers seek to
justify their behaviors in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. We want to prove we
are right, even when we are wrong. Furthermore, consumers are vulnerable to sunk
cost effect, which leads us to continue with a transaction once we "invest" any time
or money in the process. Together, these propensities dissuade us from unbiased
research and analysis necessary to make economically rational decisions. 253
Stress, lack of experience, and external mental stimuli also impact rational
decisionmaking. 254  We are vulnerable to low-ball techniques sellers use in
offering less favorable prices than a perfect market would provide. 255
Furthermore, moral constraints impact our understandings of contract duties, as
well as our actual behaviors.256 Consumers also may acquiesce in a low power
status that hinders their insistence on fair treatment. 257  Many consumers,
especially those in marginalized groups, underestimate what they "deserve."
Sellers then may use their power to capitalize on consumers' acquiescence and
optimism regarding their purchases and impose onerous form terms through their
consumer contracts. 258
This suggests that law and economics' assumptions are inherently flawed.
These assumptions are based on rote calculations and rigid rules, and "can
degenerate into combinational explosions." 259 In reality, consumers are not always
quo contract terms); Macaulay, supra note 239, at 15 ("Detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way
of creating good exchange relationships between business units.").
251 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476-80, 1546-47 (1998) (also indicating hope that economists and
lawyers would incorporate empirical findings into their assumptions). But see Gregory Mitchell, Why
Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72-74, 125-32 (2002) (critiquing behavioral law-and-economics'
view as based on only limited empirical research and failing to precisely apply data to account for
variation among decision-makers).
252 Korobkin, supra note 248, at 1607-09, 1627 (discussing psychological biases); see Joshua
Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94
PSYCHOL. REv. 211 (1987).
253 Full discussion of these patterns is beyond the scope of this Article, but I invite you to see
Becher, supra note 248, at 124-35, for further explanation of these various patterns.
254 Gary Klein, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 275-93, 161-75 (1998)
(explaining research and data on how expertise relates to decision-making).
255 See Becher, supra note 248, at 124-35.
256 Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, (Northwestern University School of Law, Law and
Economics Series No. 12-02) (Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?
abstract id=1998483 (surveying empirical analysis literature with respect to contracting).
257 See Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 29-33 (2002).
258 See Becher, supra note 248, at 136-77 (noting consumers' failure to properly assess risks and
information buried in impenetrable forms).
259 Klein, supra note 254, at 261-69 (discussing limits of rational analysis).
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economically rational and do not neatly fit economists' vision of the paradigmatic
person. Factors such as gender are salient in the real world.260 Moreover,
"success" or what is "rational" in contracting may be about more than dollars and
sense in any given context.
Accordingly, some courts and commentators question the legitimacy of
adhesion contracts companies routinely use in B2C contexts. For example, some
courts have refused to enforce the Gateway arbitration terms upheld in Hill, based
on their findings that these terms were unconscionable or constituted proposals for
modification the consumers were free to reject. 261 Courts also have found that
post-purchase terms cannot be enforced in the absence of express agreement or
without reasonable notice. 262 Some also have refused to enforce post-purchase
modifications to consumer contracts under terms giving the company free reign in
changing the contract at any time.26 3
Nonetheless, courts and commentators have resisted recognizing gender
differences and biases. Many assume men and women have attained equity in the
marketplace, and fear unpopular perceptions of discussing gender-related
behavioral and social differences. 264 This is not surprising, in that it may appear
paternalistic or improper to expressly address gender differences in opinions or
articles. Moreover, not all women or men are alike; generalizations are unwise.
That does not, however, condone silence about gender in contracting.
Instead, gender is a salient factor worth consideration as part of a contextual
analysis of real world contracts. Relational and behavioral theories therefore have
capacity for enhancing the law and literature by acknowledging that sex matters as
one of many factors impacting contracts. 265 Such consideration of gender in this
contextual analysis also should guide creation and design of programs and policies
addressing problematic gender differences in contract outcomes and experiences.
260 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 162, at 5-9 (discussing the role of gender in negotiations, but
highlighting how gender is just one of many contextual factors that play a part in contracting).
261 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338-42 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding
shrink-wrap terms were rejected proposals); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-75
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding consumers subject to terms in the box but severing the unconscionable
arbitration clause).
262 See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
a buyer could not be subject to shrink-wrap terms on a software box he received after purchasing the
software over the telephone); Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 21-25 (2d Cir. 2002)
(finding arbitration terms in an e-contract unenforceable because they were presented below the "I
accept" button).
263 See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Electronic Contracting Cases 2008-2009, 65
Bus. LAW. 317 (2009) (discussing e-contract cases).
264 See Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 204-11 (highlighting the situational complexity and
textured differences between men and women in negotiations).
265 See Wang, supra note 168. The author discussed women's social costs in negotiations and
importance of gender in understanding contract behavior. Id. at 1295.
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B. Critical Legal Theories
Recognition of the interactive character of contracts has created connections
among relational and critical feminist theorists. 266 Critical theorists also have gone
further in pushing relational and behavioral ideas to encompass the
acknowledgment of disparities due to race, gender and ethnicity.26 7  Critical
theorists argue that the law should recognize how disparities impact contractual
fairness and the workings of contract rules. 268 Critical scholars also highlight how
classical legal doctrines disparately impact different groups, and reinforce
hierarchical power imbalances in society. They expose how repeated abuses of
imbalances may result in unfair individual contracts and hinder market integrity. 269
Within the critical movement, feminist legal theorists have diverged in their
approaches toward gender in contracting: some have emphasized gender
"sameness" while others have focused on "difference." 270 Assimilationists who
emphasize gender sameness promote gender-neutrality as means for assimilating
women in the marketplace on the same terms as men. 27 1 They are hostile to the
recognition of gender differences, and to reinforcement of what they view as
gender stereotyping and paternalistic protectionism.
Some of these and other feminist scholars are open to discussion of gender in
bargaining, but challenge labeling and assumed differences between men and
women in contracting. 272 They instead propose a more nuanced vision of gender,
and reject correlation between gender and sex as reinforcement of stereotypes and
female oppression. That is in large part why these commentators promote gender-
neutral means for protecting all people regardless of biology. 273
In contrast, other feminists highlight gender differences and warn that a focus
on gender-neutrality may impede women's advancement in the marketplace. 2 74
They propose that the law should recognize gender differences and provide
protections that address these differences. Some add that the law's disparate
impacts on women perpetuate a patriarchy, and argue that legal rules reinforce the
266 See Threedy, supra note 8, at 1257-58 (noting relational contracting connections with feminism).
Note that this Article does not attempt to distill the various facets of critical legal theory or feminist legal
thought. Instead, this Article's discussion aims merely to highlight how critical and feminist
perspectives help inform contextual cognition of gender in contract law.
267 D[MATrEO ET AL., supra note 27, at 201-40 (exploring critical perspectives and the Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company case).
268 Id. at 206.
269 DIMArrEO ET AL., supra note 27, at 228-29 (discussing critical theories as applied to contract
law).
270 Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 798 (1989) (addressing
different feminist approaches).
271 Id. at 798.
272 Id. at 836-45.
273 Id. at 802.
274 Id. at 797.
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subordination that has plagued women throughout history. 275 They note that an
ostensibly "objective" law that seeks to ignore contextual differences is not truly
neutral. Instead, these vanilla laws merely reinforce status quo built on historical
prejudice and biases.
At the same time, some researchers have viewed gender as an "essential"
factor in negotiations. They propose that male and female "hard-wiring" impacts
negotiation behaviors and outcomes. 276 This is in contrast to social-constructivists
who downplay biology as far less important than externalities and context. 2 77
These scholars suggest more nuanced consideration of gender differences such as
women's cooperative and relational ethics in negotiations and resolving
disputes. 278 They highlight how policymakers should consider perspectives and
personal aspects of the individuals involved, and call for more empirical research to
uncover how feminist approaches fare in negotiations and dispute resolution. 279
In sum, relational, behavioral and critical studies highlight context and "law
in action." They push classical doctrine to recognize the realities of a world that is
not truly objective and neutral. Actors in a messy society operate within groups
with different relations, and involve individuals with their own personal
psychological and societal tendencies. Furthermore, individuals are not blind to
gender, race, age, nationality, religion, or other cultural differences. Moreover,
contextual factors work in concert on a continuum to create different contracting
cultures that may take on lives of their own.
IV. BUILDING ON CONTEXTUAL CONTRACT THEORY TO RAISE GENDER AWARENESS
IN CRAFTING LAW AND POLICY
Prevailing contract law and policies have espoused gender neutrality, or
blindness. This can be beneficial for the most part in order to avoid paternalism
and indoctrination of stereotypes, but goes awry when it ignores realities of real-
world contracting. 280 Classical contract law should give way to more contextual
theory like that discussed above, and this contextual view should inform consumer
policy and education. This means that contract scholars and policymakers should
gather and consider data regarding gender biases, stereotypes, and
behavioral/interest differences in contracting and debt accumulation. Gender
275 See e.g., Martha A. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Diferences: The Future of
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 29-33 (1990) (exploring feminist legal critique).
276 See Kolb, supra note 246, at 515-20.
277 Id.
278 Dayna Shocair Reda, Critical Conflicts Between First- Wave & Feminist Critical Approaches to
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193, 210-14 (2011); Kray & Babcock, supra
note 10, at 204-11.
279 Kray & Babcock, supra note 10, at 204-11.
280 See Keren, supra note 7, at 13341, 154-56 (highlighting how contract law has ignored
discrimination and its context).
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matters not only in traditional realms like family and labor law, but also in contract
and commercial matters. 28 1
Accordingly, step one is to gather and consider the data regarding gender in
contracting behavior and outcomes. Step two is to then use that data in crafting
contextually informed financial and contract education programs. Indeed,
antidiscrimination policy must begin by collecting the relevant data, and using that
data to raise awareness of overt and subtle biases and to inform well-designed
programs. 282 Although open discussion of gender biases and stereotypes makes
many uncomfortable, it is a necessary step in educating buyers, sellers, lenders, and
borrowers about the persistence of subtle biases that may impact consumers'
contracts.
A. Compilation and Consideration of Gender Data
Classical contract law and prevailing law and economics theory have largely
overlooked gender differences, and existing gender discrimination laws may help
alleviate overt or easily provable discrimination against women. However, these
laws do little to address subtle biases and stereotypes that hinder women in the
marketplace. 283 Furthermore, policymakers craft consumer protections per laws
such as Dodd-Frank and the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") without
considering data regarding gender differences in consumer purchasing, borrowing,
and other contracting. 284 This Article therefore invites commentators, researchers,
and policymakers to gather and consider empirical data regarding gender in not
only financing, but also sales and other contracts.
Dodd-Frank at least requires each federal agency to form an OMWI to
promote government contract opportunities for women and women-owned
businesses. 285 The regulations also direct that OMWI develop "standards and
procedures" to maximize "fair inclusion and utilization" of women and minorities
in the financial industry. 286 The law is ambiguous, however, and has left some
wondering whether it replicates existing laws or attempts to create a quota
system. 287 The law is also narrow and limited in that it does not apply to private
281 Warren, supra note 62 (highlighting how commercial law raises important gender issues).
282 See Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 400-15 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of gathering data and using
that data to raise awareness regarding biases and stereotypes in the context of race).
283 See supra Part II.B (discussing general laws).
284 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See also Sarto, supra note 4, at 349-
53 (noting lack of attention to gender issues).
285 Minority and Women Inclusion, 75 Fed. Reg. 81402 (Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R.
pt. 1207.1) (defining terms and duties of the office); Minority and Women Inclusion, 75 Fed. Reg.
81403-34 (Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. pts. 1207.3 & 1207.21) (providing that the Office
of Finance and the regulated entities shall implement policies and procedures to encourage diversity in
all contracts within financially safe and sound business practices).
286 12 U.S.C.A. § 5452(a)(3) (2010). Again, Dodd-Frank does not transfer civil rights compliance
authority to the OMWI, but it does give the OMWI a role in remedying compliance issues.
287 Id. § 5452(d). See also James Nelson Lewis, Hidden in Dodd-Frank: A Look at the Office of
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contracts or "lending policies and practices," and does not require any particular
action based on its review of existing policies. 288
That said, Dodd-Frank directs the CFPB to study various aspects of financial
products and services, and to consider this data in crafting consumer protections.
This study could include research regarding differing impacts of financial
regulations on women versus men. 28 9 As the research above indicates, gender
appears salient to contracting behaviors and outcomes. However, more data is
needed to assess how much and when gender matters with respect to contracting.
Such data would help inform CFPB programs and regulations as means for
addressing the aforementioned gender gap in debt burdens. Indeed, contextual
recognition of gender differences would contribute to sound contract and consumer
protection law.
B. Acknowledgment and Training to Address Gender
"To fully participate in society today, financial literacy is critical." 290
Increased financial literacy and training is generally beneficial for everyone-men
and women. Consumers should have access to free financial literacy resources in
order to help justify predominant contract law presuming that actors in the
marketplace have perfect information. Such resources are especially necessary to
address uneven bargaining power in B2C contexts, and consumers' growing
inabilities to understand the complexities of modem form contracts. Financial and
contracting education also may be particularly helpful in assisting women and
minorities to overcome disadvantages in the marketplace. Such education and
resources, however, have marginal value if created without the benefit of
contextual data on the linkages between financial knowledge and behaviors, well-
being, and outcomes. 2 91
Policymakers would be wise to use the relevant data in developing financial
literacy courses in all United States schools. Despite rhetoric regarding the
importance of financial education, a recent survey reported that only fourteen states
require that schools offer a course in personal finance, and only twenty-two states
Minority and Women Inclusion, THE MOD. AM. 2, 2-9 (Fall 2011) (critiquing Dodd-Frank's provisions
for the OMWI, and questioning its meaning, application, and redundancy).
288 12 U.S.C.A. §5452 (b)(4) (2010).
289 See also David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection Agency
Act of 2009 Would Change the Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products (George Mason
Univ. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series 09-51, 2009), available at http://www.1aw.gmu.edulassets/files/
publications/workingpapers/0951HowtheCFPAAct.pdf (critiquing the CFPA Act for advocating broad
applications without adequate evidentiary basis).
290 Council for Economic Education, Survey of the States: Economic and Personal Finance
Education in Our Nation's Schools, at 1 (March 2012), available at http://www.councilforeconed.org/
wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/201 1-Survey-of-the-States.pdf (last accessed July 18, 2012) (quoting
Annamaria Lusardi who is Director of the Financial Literacy Center).
291 Financial Literacy and Education Commission, 2012 Research Priorities and Research
Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 1-10, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/financial-education/Documents/2012%20Research%20Priorities%20-% 2 May%/o201 2 .pdf.
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require a high school course in economics. 292 This is an improvement since 1998,
but the trend toward providing public financial education in the schools is slowing
under budgetary pressures and remains insufficient to address students' lack of
preparation for survival in the marketplace. 293
The CFPB at least has pursued efforts to promote financial literacy and
consumer feedback mechanisms to direct future CFPB regulations and policies. 294
This has included the CFPB's partnership with the Financial Literacy & Education
Commission in creating MyMoney.gov, which promotes financial education. 295
Furthermore, the CFPB's Office of Financial Empowerment is creating policies and
programs to assist the poor and "traditionally underserved consumers" in making
wise financial decisions.29 6 This "vulnerable population" group includes women,
as well as racial and ethnic minorities. 297 Dodd-Frank also encourages OWMIs to
promote and report outreach and financial literacy programs for these groups. 29 8
Following this charge, the FDIC reported that it maintains a website with
resources aimed to help minorities and women seeking to contract with the FDIC or
292 Survey of the States, supra note 290, at 1-5.
293 Id. at 1-9 (providing statistics and charts regarding economics and personal finance classes in
United States schools).
294 Maggie Anderson, Learning to Speak Financial Products and Services, CFPB (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/learning-to-speak-financial-products-and-services/ (setting forth
CFPB initiatives aimed to help consumers navigate complicated terms and features of financial products
and services); Dan Rutherford, DFPB Promotes Financial Literacy Month, CFPB (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/cfpb-promotes-financial-literacy-month/.
(discussing CFPB programs); Dan Rutherford, Help the CFPB Solve the Most Common Consumer
Mistakes, CFPB (June 4, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/help-the-cfpb-solve-the-most-
common-consumer-mistakes/ (summarizing CFPB feedback mechanisms).
295 Richard Cordray, Joining the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, CFPB (Feb. 14,
2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/joining-the-financial-literacy-and-education-commission/;
Financial Literacy and Education Commission, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Jun. 6, 2012, 5:11 AM),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financial-education/Pages/commission-index.aspx; Know
Before You Owe, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/ (last visited July 1,
2012) (all discussing initiatives).
296 Cliff Rosenthal, Empowering America's Consumers, CFPB (May 18, 2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/empowering-americas-consumers/ (last accessed July 2, 2012).
The SEC also has partnered with the National Academy Foundation ("NAF"), a non-profit organization
dedicated to education, in order to hold an outreach event encouraging diverse students in NAF's
Academy of Finance program to pursue careers with the SEC. SEC Hosts Nationwide Shadowing Event
for High School Finance Students, SEC NEWS DIG. 2011-220, 2011 WL 5553532 (2011); SEC Kicks Off
Inaugural Shadowing Program with Academy of Finance Students, THE EXCHANGE, at 2 (June 2011),
available at http://wwwl.pgcps.org/uploadedFiles/Schools-andCenters/High Schools/CharlesH_ Flo
wers/Academics/Programs/AcademyOfFinance/Securities%20and%2OExchange%2OCommission%2
OEmployee%20Newsletter-june-2011.pdf (discussing its shadowing program, and other resources
geared to increase financial literacy among students in urban areas).
297 See Financial Literacy and Education Commission, supra note 295, at 2 (including definition of
"underserved").
298 12 U.S.C.A.§ 5452(b-e) (2010) (requiring OMWI to gather information regarding usage of
women and minority-owned businesses, make recommendations for improvements, and report related
findings annually to Congress). See also id. § 5452(f) (calling for the OMWI to partner with
organizations focused on developing career opportunities for women and minorities, and to establish or
enhance financial literacy programs at high schools oriented toward women and minorities).
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entities regulated by the FDIC. 299 Similarly, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Bank uses its FedEd Program primarily to help minority and
female students in the Washington D.C. area improve their understanding of
personal finance, including budgeting, credit, and saving money. 3 00 Various
regional Federal Reserve Banks throughout the nation also offer financial literacy
and outreach programs targeting minorities and women. 30 1
Other federal agencies have reported very little outreach pursuant to the
Dodd-Frank OMWI provisions. For example, the National Credit Union
Administration and Office of the Comptroller for the Currency did not highlight
any outreach programs to encourage financial literacy for women in their recent
OMWI reports to Congress. 302 OMWI reports, however, do not necessarily tell the
full story. The Federal Housing Financing Agency did not mention in its report
that it has partnered with organizations already providing financial education. 303
In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") said nothing in its
report about its partnership with others in offering a program aimed to promote
minority and women inclusion in agency activities. 304
As noted above, the FINRA study concluded that financial literacy training
would provide a start in mitigating gender differences in costly credit card
299 FED DEP. INS. CORP., 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OFFICE OF MINORITY AND WOMEN
INCLUSION, 1-6, available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/diversity/sbrp/index.html (last updated Nov. 11,
2011).
300 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE OFFICE OF
MINORITY AND WOMEN INCLUSION 1-11 (2012) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/other-reports/files/omwi-report-20120402.pdf (also noting how presentations mainly target
these students in the Washington D.C. area).
301 See, e.g., FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA, O.M.W.I., CONGRESSIONAL REPORT 2011: ANNUAL
REVIEW 1-11 (2012) (noting program in Atlanta); FED. RES. BANK OF Bos., OFFICE OF DIVERSITY AND
INCLUSION, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-17 (2012) (discussing program teaching personal
finance skills through six lessons during the course of a high-school Algebra class); FED. RES. BANK OF
CHI., O.M.W.I., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-24 (2012) (noting the Seventh District Bank's
partnership with Ford Motor Credit in holding workshops to educate primarily high-school students
about financial success); FED. RES. BANK OF CLE., O.M.W.I., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2011, 1-
18 (2012) (noting its distribution of a financial literacy workbook focused on reaching minorities and
women); FED. RES. BANK OF DALL., O.M.W.I., 2011 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT 1-11 (2012) (noting its
publication of a basic money managing booklet); FED. RES. BANK OF K.C., O.M.W.I., 2011 REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1-20 (2012) (describing its Student Board of Directors which provides minority and female
high-school students with an opportunity to learn about financial responsibility and potential careers in
the financial sector); FED. RES. BANK OF MINN., O.M.W.I., 2011 CONGRESSIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 15-
16 (2012) (noting its outreach website); FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., O.M.W.I., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2012) (sponsoring a workshop targeting minorities and women).
302 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, O.M.W.I., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2012); NAT'L CREDIT
UNION ADMIN., O.M.W.I., 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS (2012); O.C.C., O.M.W.I., 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2012).
303 See memo from David Bennett, Research Associate, to Amy J. Schmitz, July 13, 2012
(documenting interview with Lee Bowman, Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of
Minorities and Women Inclusion (on file with author)) (also noting work to create standards for
incentivizing entities to incorporate good faith practices, and indicating interest in ideas for educating
entities about gender and ethnic bias in contracting).
30 S.E.C., O.M.W.I., ANNUAL REPORT (2012). But see SEC Hosts Nationwide Shadowing Event,
supra note 296.
2013] 479
480 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF LAW & GENDER
behaviors.305 Scholars at Dartmouth also have proposed financial literacy
programs targeting women based on their finding that only twenty-nine percent of
the women they surveyed-all over age fifty-answered these questions about
finances correctly: one question on interest rates, one on inflation, and one on risk
diversification. 306 Researchers found that the respondents mostly struggled with
the risk diversification question, and highlighted need for further research on how
to design financial literacy programs to serve women over fifty. 307
Many charitable organizations, credit unions, and other public and private
bodies also provide financial literacy resources that generally do not require public
funding. 308 Some of these financial education programs also target women. For
example, the Wi$eUp program created under the Women's Bureau of the
Department of Labor covers the following topics targeted to benefit women in
financial decisions: Money for Life, Money Math, Money Basics, Credit in a
Money World, Savings Basics, Insurance & Risk Management, Becoming an
Investor, and Achieving Financial Security. 309 WISER is a similar program
focused on improving "the long-term financial quality of life for women." 3 10
WISER educates women through publications and workshops covering topics
including scam avoidance, 3 11 investments, 3 12 and retirement.3 13
Such programs may promote economically wise contracting, especially when
borrowing and investing. However, they may do little to address subtle biases,
stereotypes, and behaviors that may lead to the gender differences in contract and
debt outcomes. It may be more important to educate women on how to overcome
their reluctance to proactively negotiate on their own behalf for fear they will
305 See Mottola, supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing FINRA study).
306 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Planning and Financial Literacy: How Do Women
Fare?, 98 AM. ECON. REv.: PAPERS & PROC. 413, 413-15 (2008), available at http://www.
dartmouth.edu/-alusardi/ Papers/AER-FinalPublishedVersion.pdf (basing findings on survey asking
three questions).
307 Id. at 417.
300 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, O.M.W.I., TAKING STOCK & MAKING CHANGE: ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2012) (summarizing some of the partnerships and programs
the Treasury has participated in to encourage all people to enter the financial profession).
309 About WiseUp, WISEUP, http://wiseupwomen.tamu.edu/about-us.php (last visited July 22, 2012).
The program is hosted out of Texas A&M and it was created under the Women's Bureau of the
Department of Labor. WiSeUp augments its online curriculum with in-classroom courses at facilities in
seven regional hubs of the Women's Bureau. Wi$eUp Course Overview, WISEUP,
http://wiseupwomen.tamu.edu/02-leaming-center/lessons-catalog.php (last visited July 22, 2012).
310 About Us, WISER, http://www.wiserwomen.org/index.php?id=8&page=About Us (last visited
July 22, 2012).
311 WISER's "Too Good To Be True" Checklist, WISER, http://www.wiserwomen.org/index.php?
id=147&page=WISER (last visited July 22, 2012).
312 Investment Calculator, WISER, http://www.wiserwomen.org/index.php?id=73 I &page=
Investment Calculator (last visited July 22, 2012).
313 Publications, WISER, http://www.wiserwomen.org/index.php?id=62&page=Publications (last
visited July 22, 2012). See also Research, WISER, http://www.wiserwomen.org/index.php?
id=47&page=Research (last visited July 22, 2012) (providing a database of research on women &
retirement issues) (distilling issues impacting women's financial futures).
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contravene societal expectations. 3 14 Educators also advise women to be aware of
their own gender "lens" and fight against belief in what is "gender appropriate."
They urge women to believe in their own self-worth, and collaborate with other
women in improving their environments. 315
Although such acknowledgement of gender differences and empowerment
training may raise "political correctness" concerns, law and policy should not
ignore studies that support its effectiveness. For example, male MBA students
obtained economically superior contracts than the female students in a series of
negotiation studies although all participants shared similar experience, education
and inherent ability. 316 In addition, the men obtained even better contracts than the
women when study facilitators subtly reinforced stereotypes by telling participants
that "rational and assertive" individuals do better than "passive" individuals in
negotiations, or that the exercise was diagnostic of their abilities. 317
However, the female study participants achieved much better results in the
contract negotiations when study facilitators were open and straightforward in
acknowledging that men and women may differ in their contracting behaviors and
performance. 3 18 The facilitators told the students that variations in gendered
characteristics cause men and women to "differ in their performance." 3 19
Researchers concluded that explicitly acknowledging gender differences led female
students to reject and act against stereotypes. 320 Consequently, the female students
were more assertive and achieved better results.
This suggests that improved awareness of gendered propensities and
bargaining pitfalls may help level the playing field for women in contract
negotiations. 321 Raising awareness of gender differences and stereotypes may
have similarly helped the women in the FINRA study noted above to obtain credit
card rates on par with their male counterparts who shared equal financial
literacy. 32 2 Open discussion of gender stereotypes and differences also educates
lenders and merchants to be more aware of subtle and subconscious biases that may
314 See Coleman & Weaver, supra note 84, at 15-18 (discussing research and anecdotes regarding
female barriers in negotiations and suggesting how women can overcome those barriers to achieve better
results in negotiations).
315 Id.
316 Laura Kray et al., Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation and Reactance in
Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 942, 949-56 (2001) [hereinafter Kray, Battle of the
Sexes].
317 Id. at 942-47 (noting how such subtle bias is common in modem negotiations, and leads women
to underperform while the men gain confidence from the stereotype reinforcement).
318 Id. at 945-49.
319 Id. at 949-51.
320 Id. at 952-56. See also Laura J. Kray et al., supra note 10.
321 Kray, Battle of the Sexes, supra note 316, at 954-56 (highlighting benefits of coaching and
consultation)
322 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing FINRA's finding that women paid higher
rates, even controlling for measured financial literacy and demographic characteristics).
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drive them to steer women toward less economically attractive loans and other
contracts.
It also would be beneficial to empower all consumers by distilling how men
and women can learn from each other's contracting strengths. Female contracting
tendencies may not only hinder, but also help them in the marketplace. For
example, the Workways program at New York University Law School helped
boost female confidence in negotiations by stressing the importance of narrative
skills and interpersonal abilities, which are often areas of strength for female
negotiators. 323 Accordingly, women may benefit from becoming more assertive-
a traditional male strength-while men may benefit from becoming more
empathetic and expressive.
Nonetheless, it is tough to ignore societal realities, as evidenced by research
regarding the double bind women face if they assert themselves in the same manner
as men. 324 Educators and policymakers should raise awareness that it is "ok" for
women to be properly assertive. At the same time, women may capitalize on
society's expectations of the nurturing female by working within core stereotypes.
For example, women may benefit from framing their assertive behavior as other-
oriented rather than self-interested and emphasizing common goals and team
affiliation. 325
Again, acknowledgement of gender differences and biases should not
reinforce stereotypes or rest on improper generalizations, and contract and financial
education should be available to both men and women. 326 However, contract law
and policy should recognize what research generally confirms and relational and
behavioral theorists have long proposed: Individuals are not all economically
rational actors with perfect information, and may instead fall prey to behavioral and
psychological tendencies depending on contextual factors, including gender.
Accordingly, it is important to be forthright in raising awareness regarding gender
differences in contract behaviors and values. This not only sheds light on realities,
but also should help guide training and education to address these differences. 327
This training and education must nonetheless be careful to recognize that men
and women do not fit any particular molds. Furthermore, financial and contracting
education need not add to public costs or even be provided by the government.
Instead, non-profit organizations could provide such resources alongside financial
literacy courses they already offer. For example, the NAF's financial literacy
program noted above could include discussion of gender and collaborative training.
323 Farber & Rickenberg, supra note 104, at 278 (explaining Workways program).
324 See Schneider, supra note 122, and accompanying text (discussing research by Schneider and
others noting the likeability versus competent double bind).
325 Id. at 240-45 (also noting how women may benefit by enhancing multidimensionality in
interactions with other parties to break out of the male/female dichotomy).
326 Id. at 243-44 (emphasizing difficulty of even getting women to admit differences or biases).
327 See also Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 39, at 653-54 (emphasizing need for awareness of
gender differences in negotiation behaviors and values, and training to address these differences).
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Its summer internships also could be offered on a larger scale, depending on
financial contributions and company interest. 328 Such programs created in light of
honest consideration of contextual data benefit everyone. The aim should be to
raise awareness of gender differences in contracting while boosting financial and
contracting literacy more generally.
CONCLUSION
Gender differences in contract outcomes, behaviors and interests persist
despite advances women have made in the workplace and marketplace. However,
there is a surprising silence regarding gender in contract law and literature. Instead,
dominant voices in the field mainly reflect classical and economics-driven theories,
which largely ignore gender. Furthermore, many mistakenly assume that market
competition and antidiscrimination legislation address any improper biases in
contracting. In reality, the consumer market is imperfect and legislation often is
ineffective in addressing the subtle biases that persist in consumer contexts.
Accordingly, it is time to shed light on gender in contract and consumer law.
All women are not alike and there is need for more research. However, the
available data suggests that sex matters, empirically and practically, with respect to
contracting. This Article therefore invites more research and open discussion about
gender biases, stereotypes, and behavioral and outcome differences in contracting.
Also, it suggests greater awareness of context in contract law, along with ideas for
incorporating contextual considerations into creation of financial literacy and
contract education programs that acknowledge gender while honoring individuality
and avoiding stereotype reinforcement.
328 See SEC Hosts Nationwide Shadowing Event, supra note 296; see also SEC Kicks Off Inaugural
Shadowing Program, supra note 296, at 2.
4832013]1
484 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF LAW & GENDER
APPENDICES: SURVEY RESULTS RELATED TO GENDER AND
CONTRACTING
APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Age
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 18-24 yrs old 19 6.2 6.2 6.2
25-29 yrs old 16 5.2 5.2 11.4
30-39 yrs old 40 13.1 13.1 24.5
40-49 yrs old 73 23.9 23.9 48.4
50-59 yrs old 81 26.5 26.5 74.8
60-69 yrs old 54 17.6 17.6 92.5
70 yrs or over 23 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Household Income
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid less than $20k 43 14.1 17.1 17.1
$20,000-$29,999 33 10.8 13.1 30.3
$30,000-$39,999 43 14.1 17.1 47.4
$40,000-$49,999 32 10.5 12.7 60.2
$50,000-$59,999 22 7.2 8.8 68.9
$60,000-$74,999 26 8.5 10.4 79.3
$75,000-$99,999 24 7.8 9.6 88.8
$100,000-$149,999 23 7.5 9.2 98.0
$150,00+ 5 1.6 2.0 100.0
Total 251 82.0 100.0




Freguency Percent Percent Percent
Valid single, never married 58 19.0 19.0 19.0
married 150 49.0 49.0 68.0
separated/divorced/widowed 75 24.5 24.5 92.5
domestic partnership 23 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 306 100.0 1000
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Gender
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid male 103 33.7 33.7 33.
female 203 66.3 66.3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Employment Status
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid full-time 129 42.2 42.2 42.2
part-time 49 16.0 16.0 58.2
not employed 128 41.8 41.8 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0,
Education Level
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid some HS 5 1.6 1.6 1.6
HS grad 34 11.1 11.1 12.7
some College 135 44.1 44.1 56.9
College degree 78 25.5 25.5 82.4
some postgrad 17 5.6 5.6 87.9
Master's degree 27 8.8 8.8 96.7
PhD/Law/Pro degree 10 3.3 3.3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
Respondent Occupation
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid exec/upper mgmt 12 3.9 4.5 4.5
IT/MIS professional 11 3.6 4.1 8.6
doctor/surgeon 2 .7 .7 9.4
educator 11 3.6 4.1 13.5
homemaker 33 10.8 12.4 25.8
student 13 4.2 4.9 30.7
none of above 168 54.9 62.9 93.6
small biz owner 17 5.6 6.4 100.0
Total 267 87.3 100.0
Missing System 39 12.7
Total 306 100.0 1
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Racial/Ethnic Identification
Valid Cumulative
Freuency Percent Percent Percent
Valid unspecified 45 14.7 14.7 14.7
other 6 2.0 2.0 16.7
hispanic 6 2.0 2.0 18.6
multi: hispanic/other 2 .7 .7 19.3
pacific islander 2 .7 .7 19.9
indian 2 .7 .7 20.6
multi: hispanic indian 1 .3 .3 20.9
asian 3 1.0 1.0 21.9
black 2 .7 .7 22.5
white 228 74.5 74.5 97.1
multi: white/other 1 .3 .3 97.4
multi: white/hispanic 4 1.3 1.3 98.7
multi: white/pacific/hispanic 1 .3 .3 99.0
multi: white/indian 2 .7 .7 99.7
multi: white/indian/hispanic 1 .3 .3 100.0
Total 306 100.0 100.0
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APPENDIX B
Section 1, Question 3: When you do "shop around" or compare choices, what leads you to
make final purchasing decisions? Think about the factors below, and indicate how
important each of the factors generally is to you in deciding what to buy.
Store Reputation
very somewhat minot not
importan importan importanc importan Total
male Count 26 53 19 4 102
% within Gender 25.50/ 52.00/ 18.6% 3.9% 100.0%
% within slq3d 25.7% 34.6% 46.3% 57.1% 33.8%
purchase factors:
store reputation
% of Total 8.6% 17.50/ 6.3% 1.3% 33.8%
female Count 75 100 22 3 200
% within Gender 37.5% 50.0% 11.0% 1.5% 100.0%
% within slq3d 74.3% 65.4% 53.7% 42.9% 66.2%
purchase factors:
store reputation
% of Total 24.8% 33.1% 7.30/ 1.0%/ 66.2%
Total Count 101 153 41 7 302
% within Gender 33.4% 50.7% 13.6% 2.3% 100.0%
% within slq3d 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
purchase factors:
store reputation
% of Total 33.4/ 50.70/ 13.60/ 2.3/ 100.0%
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. T' Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.121 .05 -2.24C .025
of Valid Cases 304
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Friend/Family Recommendation
very somewhat minor not
important importan importanc important Total
male Count 11 47 34 10 102
% within Gender 10.80/ 46.1%! 33.3% 9.8% 100.0%




% of Total 3.60/ 15.5% 11.2% 3.30/ 33.6%
female Count 32 107 53 10 202
% within Gender 15.8% 53.0% 26.2% 5.0% 100.0%




% of Total 10.5% 35.2% 17.4% 3.30/ 66.4%
Total Count 43 154 87 20 304
% within Gender 14.1% 50.7% 28.6% 6.6% 100.0%




% of Total 14.1/ 50.7% 28.6% 6.6/ 100.0
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.121 .05 -2.241 .025
of Valid Cases 301
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Friendly Salesperson
very somewhat minor not
important important importanc importan Total
male Count 18 45 30 8 101
% within Gender 17.80/ 44.60/ 29.70/ 7.9% 100.0%
% within slq3L 29.50/ 30.20/ 38.00/ 57.1% 33.3%
purchase factors:
friendly salesperson
% of Total 5.9% 14.9% 9.90/ 2.6% 33.3%
female Count 43 104 49 6 202
% within Gender 21.3% 51.5% 24.3% 3.0% 100.0%
% within slq3L 70.5% 69.8% 62.0% 42.9% 66.7%
purchase factors:
friendly salesperson
% of Total 14.2% 34.3% 16.20/ 2.0% 66.7%
Total Count 61 149 79 14 303
% within Gender 20.1% 49.2% 26.1% 4.6% 100.0%
% within s1q3L 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
purchase factors:
friendly salesperson
% of Total 20.10/ 49.2/ 26.10/ 4.60/ 100.0%
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.09 .055 -1.772 .076
of Valid Cases 303
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
4892013]
490 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF LAW & GENDER
APPENDIX C
Section 1, Question 4 Car: You have decided that you would like to purchase a particular
model of a new car with certain options. Two car dealerships in your area list this new car
with the options you want at the same price. At one of the dealerships, you learn or
experience the following, listed below. How important would each of these be in leading you
toward purchasing at this dealership instead of the other?
Salesperson makes eye contact
ver somewhat mino not
importan importan importanc importan Total
male Count 3 47 15 5 103
% within Gender 35.00/ 45.6% 14.6% 4.9% 100.0%
% within slq4i car: 24.0%/ 39.50/ 53.6% 62.5% 33.8%
salesperson makes
eye contact
% of Total 11.80/ 15.4% 4.9% 1.60/ 33.8%
female Count 114 72 13 3 202
% within Gender 56.4% 35.6% 6.4% 1.5% 100.0%
% within slq4i car: 76.0% 60.5% 46.4% 37.5% 66.2%
salesperson makes
eye contact
% of Total 37.4% 23.6% 4.3% 1.00% 66.2%
Total Count 15C 119 28 8 305
% within Gender 49.2% 39.0% 9.2% 2.6% 100.0%
% within slq4i car: 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
salesperson makes
eye contact
% of Total 49.20/ 39.0%! 9.20/ 2.60/ 100.0%
S rmmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Error' Approx. To Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.215 .054 -3.952 .00
of Valid Cases 305
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Other dealership sued for discrimination
very somewhat minot not
important importan importanc importan Total
male Count 24 26 28 25 103
% within Gender 23.30/ 25.20/ 27.20/ 24.3% 100.0%




% of Total 7.9% 8.5% 9.2% 8.2% 33.8%
femaleCount 81 68 32 21 202
% within Gender 40.1% 33.7% 15.8% 10.4% 100.0%




% of Total 26.6% 22.3% 10.5% 6.9% 66.2%
Total Count 105 94 6C 46 305
% within Gender 34.4% 30.8% 19.7% 15.1% 100.0%




% of Total 34.4% 30.8/ 19.70/ 15.10/ 100.00/
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Error Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.224 .051 -4.306 .00
of Valid Cases 305
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Dealership donates 5% to charity
very somewhat minor not
important importan importance important Total
male Count 13 30 37 23 103
% within Gender 12.60/ 29.1% 35.90/ 22.3% 100.0%




% of Total 4.3% 9.9% 12.2% 7.60/ 34.0%
female Count 49 85 50 16 200
% within Gender 24.5% 42.5% 25.0% 8.0% 100.0%




% of Total 16.2% 28.1% 16.50/ 5.3% 66.0%
Total Count 62 115 87 39 303
% within Gender 20.5% 38.0% 28.7% 12.9% 100.0%




% of Total 20.5/ 38.0/ 28.7/ 12.90/ 100.00
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.236 .051 -4.552 .00
of Valid Cases 303
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
[Vol. 19:437
CONSIDERING GENDER IN CONTRACTING
Dealers ip is environmentally friendly
very somewhat minor not
importan importan importanc importan Total
male Count 17 42 30 14 103
% within Gender 16.50/ 40.8% 29.1% 13.6% 100.0%




% of Total 5.6% 13.8% 9.8% 4.6% 33.8%
female Count 62 82 46 12 202
% within Gender 30.7% 40.6% 22.8% 5.9% 100.0%




% of Total 20.3% 26.9% 15.1% 3.9% 66.2%
Total Count 79 124 76 26 305
% within Gender 25.9% 40.7% 24.9% 8.5% 100.0%




% of Total 25.9% 40.70/ 24.9% 8.50/ 100.00/
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Error' Approx. To Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -. 170 .051 -3.273 .001
of Valid Cases 305
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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APPENDIX D
Section 1, Question 5: Think about what would be important to you if you needed to
purchase a new cellular phone service plan and a cellular phone to use with the new plan.
Please indicate the importance of each of the following factors.
Warranties
very somewhat minor not
important importan importanc importan Total
male Count 33 25 32 13 103
% within Gender 32.00/ 24.3% 31.1% 12.6% 100.0%




% of Total 10.90/ 8.3% 10.6% 4.30/ 34.0%
female Count 88 59 33 20 200
% within Gender 44.0% 29.5% 16.5% 10.0% 100.0%




% of Total 29.00/ 19.5% 10.9% 6.6% 66.0%
Total Count 121 84 65 33 303
% within Gender 39.9% 27.7% 21.5% 10.9% 100.0%




% of Total 39.9% 27.70/ 21.5% 10.90/ 100.0%
Symmetric Measures
Valuc Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. Tb Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.13 .053 -2.613 .009
of Valid Cases 303
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Cancelation of Service Policy
very somewhat minor not
importan important importanc importan Total
male Count 45 42 13 3 103
% within Gender 43.70/ 40.8% 12.6% 2.9% 100.0%




% of Total 14.9% 13.9% 4.3% 1.0% 34.0%
female Count 118 62 14 6 200
% within Gender 59.0% 31.0% 7.0% 3.0% 100.0%




% of Total 38.9% 20.5% 4.60/ 2.0% 66.0%
Total Count 163 104 27 9 303
% within Gender 53.8% 34.3% 8.9% 3.0% 100.0%




% of Total 53.8/ 34.3/ 8.9/ 3.0/ 100.0%
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. TI Approx. Sig.1
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -. 139 .055 -2.523 .012
of Valid Cases 303
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Time Required on Contract
very somewhat minor not
important importan importance importan Total
male Count 62 34 3 4 103
% within Gender 60.2% 33.0% 2.9% 3.9% 100.0%




% of Total 20.5/ 11.3% 1.0% 1.3/ 34.1%
female Count 146 37 8 8 199
% within Gender 73.4% 18.6% 4.0% 4.0% 100.0%




% of Total 48.3% 12.3% 2.6% 2.60/ 65.9%
TotalCount 208 71 11 12 302
% within Gender 68.9% 23.5% 3.6% 4.0% 100.0%
/o within slq5h cell phone: 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
time required on contract
% of Total 68.90/ 23.5% 3.6% 4.0% 100.0%
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.116 .057 -2.039 .041
N of Valid Cases 302
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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APPENDIX E
Section 2, Question 1: Did you read purchase terms before you bought [an electronic
entertainmnt item such as a television, DVD player, VCR, iPod, stereo, or stereo
equipment]?
no yes Total
male Count 49 52 101
% within Gender 48.50/ 51.5% 100.0%
% within s2qlC did you read 29.00/ 43.0% 34.8%
purchase terms before bought
item?
% of Total 16.9% 17.9% 34.80
female Count 12C 69 189
% within Gender 63.5% 36.5% 100.0%
% within s2qlC did you read 71.0% 57.0% 65.2%
purchase terms before bought
item?
% of Total 41.4% 23.8% 65.2%
Total Count 169 121 290
% within Gender 58.3% 41.7% 100.0%
% within s2qlC did you read 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
purchase terms before bought
item?
% of Total 58.3/ 41.7/ 100.0%
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Erro Approx. T Approx. Si
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.145 .05 -2.45 0IN of Valid Cases 1 2901
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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APPENDIX F
Section 2, Question 2: If you read the terms before you got the credit card, did you consider
any terms important in deciding you wanted that card?
no yes Total
male Count 7 38 45
% within Gender 15.6% 84.4% 100.0%
% within s2q2d if read, were terms important 23.3% 42.2% 37.5%
% of Total 5.8% 31.70/ 37.5%
female Count 23 52 75
% within Gender 30.7% 69.3% 100.0%
% within s2q2d if read, were terms important 76.7% 57.8% 62.5%
% of Total 19.2% 43.3% 62.5%
Total Count 3 90 12
% within Gender 25.0% 75.0% 100.00
% within s2q2d if read, were terms important 100.00 100.0% 100.00
% of Total 25.00 75.0% 100.00
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. Exact Sig.
Value d (2-sided) (2-sided) (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 3.425' 1 .064
Continuity Correctionb 2.667 1 .102
Likelihood Ratio 3.599 1 .058
Fisher's Exact Test 
.08 049
near-by-Linear Association 3.39 1 .065
of Valid Cases 12 0 1
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.25.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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APPENDIX G
Section 2, Question 6 Form Terms: Think generally about purchase terms that sellers
provide in a standard form. Again, as described at the start of Part II, these form terms may
be provided at a store, in the mall, in or on product packaging, or on the seller's website or
the Internet. With this in mind, indicate your level of agreement with the following
statements about such form terms.
I assume I cannot get a seller to chan e form terms
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly
agree agree neutral disagree disagree Total
male Count 3C 33 25 11 4 103
% within Gender 29.10/ 32.00/ 24.30/ 10.70/ 3.9% 100.0%
% within s2q6b 34.1% 28.9% 43.90/ 34.40/ 28.6% 33.8%
form terms: assume
cannot change
% of Total 9.8% 10.80/ 8.2% 3.60 1.30/ 33.8%
female Count 58 81 32 21 10 202
% within Gender 28.7% 40.10/ 15.8% 10.40 5.0% 100.0%
% within s2q6b 65.9% 71.10/ 56.1% 65.60 71.4% 66.2%
form terms: assume
cannot change
% of Total 19.00/ 26.60/ 10.5% 6.9% 3.30/ 66.2%
Total Count 88 114 57 32 14 305
% within Gender 28.9% 37.4% 18.7% 10.5% 4.6% 100.0%
% within s2q6b 100.0% 100.00/ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.00/
form terms: assum
cannot change
% of Total 28.90/ 37.4/ 18.70/ 10.5%/ 4.60/ 100.0/
Symmetric Measures
I Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. Tj Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.028 .053 -.53 .592
of Valid Cases 305
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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I believe it is a waste of time to read form terms
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly
agree agree neutral disagre disagree Total
male Count 2 8 26 27 40 103
% within Gender 1.9% 7.8% 25.2% 26.2% 38.8% 100.0%
% within s2q6h 50.0% 36.4% 41.9% 32.9%/ 29.9% 33.9%
form terms: waste
of time to read
% of Total .7% 2.6% 8.6% 8.90/ 13.20/ 33.9%
female Count 2 14 36 55 94 201
% within Gender 1.00/ 7.0% 17.9% 27.4% 46.80/ 100.0%
% within s2q6h 50.0% 63.6% 58.1% 67.1% 70.1% 66.1%
form terms: waste
of time to read
% of Total .7% 4.6% 11.8% 18.1% 30.90/ 66.1%
Total Count 4 22 62 82 134 304
% within Gender 1.30/ 7.2% 20.4% 27.0% 44.10/ 100.0%
% within s2q6h 100.00/ 100.00 100.00/ 100.0% 100.00/ 100.0%
form terms: waste
of time to read
% of Total 1.30/ 7.2/ 20.40/ 27.00/ 44.10/ 100.00/
Symmetric Measures
Value Asym . Std. Errori Approx. T A rox. Si
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .085 .0 1.58 .113N of Valid Cases 3041
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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I think it is very im iortant to read contract terms
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly
agree agree neutral disagree disagree Total
male Count 44 33 22 2 1 102
% within Gender 43.10/ 32.40/ 21.60/ 2.0% 1.00/ 100.0%
% within s2q6i 31.7/ 32.40/ 44.0% 22.20/ 25.0% 33.6%
form terms: very
important to read
% of Total 14.5% 10.90/ 7.2% .7% .3% 33.6%
female Count 95 69 28 7 3 202
% within Gender 47.0% 34.2% 13.9% 3.5% 1.5% 100.0%
% within s2q6i 68.3% 67.6% 56.0% 77.8% 75.0% 66.4%
form terms: very
important to read
% of Total 31.3% 22.70/ 9.2% 2.3% 1.0% 66.40/
Total Count 139 102 50 9 4 304
% within Gender 45.7% 33.6% 16.4% 3.0% 1.3% 100.0%
% within s2q6i 100.0% 100.00/ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
form terms: very
important to read
% of Total 45.70/ 33.60/ 16.40/ 3.0% 1.30/ 100.0%/
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. Tt Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.04 05 - 843 .399
N of Valid Cases 304
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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I do not see why I should read form terms
strongly somewhat somewhat strongly
agree agree neutral disagree disagree Total
male Count 1 7 23 3 42 103
% within Gender 1.0% 6.80/ 22.3% 29.10/ 40.8% 100.0%
% within s2q6j 33.3% 41.2% 39.70 33.70 30.7% 33.9%
form terms: don't
see why I should
read
% of Total .3% 2.3% 7.60/ 9.9% 13.80/ 33.9%
female Count 2 1C 35 59 95 201
% within Gender 1.00 5.00/ 17.4% 29.4% 47.3% 100.0%
% within s2q6j 66.7% 58.80/ 60.3% 66.3% 69.3% 66.1%
form terms: don't
see why I should
read
% of Total .7% 3.30/ 11.50/ 19.4% 31.30/ 66.1%
Total Count 3 17 58 89 137 304
% within Gender 1.0% 5.6% 19.1% 29.3% 45.1% 100.0%
% within s2q6j 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
form terms: don't
see why I should
read
% of Total 1.00/ 5.60 19.10/ 29.3/ 45.1/ 100.00
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b .07 .051 1.291 .19
of Valid Cases 304
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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APPENDIX H
Section 2, Question 70(f) Important terms: Think generally about the times when you have
looked at contract terms at any point with respect to your purchase of products or services.
Were any of the terms important to you? Indicate how you generally view the importance of
the following types of terms.
Warranties
very somewhat minor not
important importan importanc important Total
male Count 72 29 2 0 103
% within Gender 69.90/ 28.20/ 1.90/ .00/ 100.0%
% within s2q7b imp 30.50/ 47.50/ 40.0% .0% 34.0%
terms: warranties
% of Total 23.8% 9.6% .7% .0% 34.0%
female Count 164 32 3 1 200
% within Gender 82.0% 16.0% 1.5% .5% 100.0%
% within s2q7b imp 69.5% 52.5% 60.0% 100.0% 66.0%
terms: warranties
% of Total 54.1% 10.6% 1.0% .30/ 66.0%
Total Count 236 61 5 1 303
% within Gender 77.9% 20.1% 1.7% .3% 100.0%
% within s2q7b imp 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
terms: warranties
% of Total 77.9/ 20.1% 1.7% .30/ 100.00%
Symmetric Measures
I Value Asymp. Std. Errorl Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.13 .05 -2.231 .025
of Valid Cases 303
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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Jb: What types of terms have you been able to get changed in form
Warranties
no yes Total
Gender male Count 82 21 103
% within Gender 79.6% 20.4% 100.0%
% within s3qlBb 30.9% 51.2% 33.7%
changed: warranties
% of Total 26.8% 6.9% 33.7%
female Count 183 20 203
% within Gender 90.1% 9.9% 100.0%
% within s3qlBb 69.1% 48.8% 66.3%
changed: warranties
% of Total 59.8% 6.5% 66.3%
Total Count 265 41 306
% within Gender 86.6% 13.4% 100.0%
% within s3qlBb 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
changed: warranties
% of Total 86.6/ 13.40/ 100.0%
Chi-Square Tests







a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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Interest rate for credit payme t
no yes Total
male Count 82 21 103
% within Gender 79.6% 20.4% 100.0%
% within s3qlBd changed: 31.5% 45.7% 33.7%
interest rate for credit payment
% of Total 26.8% 6.9% 33.7%
female Count 178 25 203
% within Gender 87.7% 12.3% 100.0%
% within s3qlBd changed: 68.5% 54.3% 66.3%
interest rate for credit payment
% of Total 58.2% 8.2% 66.3%
Total Count 260 46 306
% within Gender 85.0% 15.0% 100.0%
% within s3qlBd changed: 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
interest rate for credit payment
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. Exact Sig.
Value di (2-sided) (2-sided (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 3.487' 1 .062
Continuity Correctionb 2.883 1 .090
Likelihood Ratio 3.359 1 .067
Fisher's Exact Test .065 .047
inear-by-Linear Association 3.475 1 .062
of Valid Cases 306 1
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.48.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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APPENDIX J
Section 3, Question 1: Focus on your consumer purchases and the form contracts or
purchase terms you encounter when buying consumer products and services. Roughly, how
often do you try to negotiate or change such form contracts or terms when you purchase
consumer products or services?
nearly
half the all the
never rarely sometimes time frequentl time Total
male Count 26 28 31 6 7 3 101
% within 25.7% 27.7% 30.7% 5.9% 6.9%/ 3.0% 100.0%
Gender





% of Total 8.6% 9.20/ 10.2% 2.00/ 2.3% 1.00/ 33.3%
female Count 89 55 34 8 12 4 202
% within 44.1% 27.2% 16.8% 4.0% 5.9% 2.0% 100.0%
Gender





% of Total 29.4% 18.2% 11.2% 2.60/ 4.0% 1.30/ 66.7%
Total Count 115 83 65 14 19 7 303
% within 38.0% 27.4% 21.5% 4.6% 6.3% 2.3% 100.0%
Gender





% of Total 38.0% 27.40/ 21.50/ 4.60 6.30/ 2.30 100.0%
S, mmetric Measures
Valuel Asymp. Std. Error' Approx. Tj Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.17 .051 -3.35 .001
I of Valid Cases 303
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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CONSIDERING GENDER IN CONTRACTING
APPENDIX K
Section 3, Question 2Be: Which of the following best describes how you felt about these
experiences?
I did not learn anything I did not already know
no ys Total
male Count 94 9 103
% within Gender 91.30/ 8.7% 100.0%
% within s3q2Be feelings: 32.4% 56.3% 33.7%
did not learn anything new
% of Total 30.7% 2.9% 33.7%
female Count 196 7 203
% within Gender 96.6% 3.4% 100.0%
% within s3q2Be feelings: 67.6% 43.8% 66.3%
did not learn anything new
% of Total 64.1% 2.3% 66.3%
Total Count 290 16 306
% within Gender 94.8% 5.2% 100.0%
% within s3q2Be feelings: 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
did not learn anything new
% of Total 94.80/ 5.20/ 100.0%/
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. Exact Sig.
Value di (2-sided) (2-sided) (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 3.858' 1 .050
Continuity Correctionb 2.865 1 .091
Likelihood Ratio 3.618 1 .057
Fisher's Exact Test .06C .048
Linear-by-Linear 3.846 1 .05
Association
N of Valid Cases 306 1
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.39.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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APPENDIX L
Section 4, Question 1: How often do you confront or deal with contracts through work or
other channels outside of your role as a consumer purchasing goods and services for your
personal, household or family needs? Check the best estimate.
very sporadic few times a almost
never rarely thru ye month dail Total
male Count 20 32 25 19 7 103
% within Gender 19.4% 31.1% 24.3% 18.4% 6.8% 100.0%





% of Total 6.5% 10.5% 8.20/ 6.2% 2.3%/ 33.7%
female Count 58 72 45 15 13 203
% within Gender 28.6% 35.5% 22.2% 7.4% 6.4% 100.0%





% of Total 19.0% 23.5% 14.70/ 4.9% 4.20/ 66.3%
Total Count 78 104 70 34 20 306
% within Gender 25.5% 34.0% 22.9% 11.1% 6.5% 100.0%





% of Total 25.5/ 34.0% 22.90/ 11.1/ 6.5/ 100.00%
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Error' Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.13 .051 -2.553 .011
of Valid Cases 30
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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CONSIDERING GENDER IN CONTRACTING
APPENDIX M
Section 4, Question 2: Which of the following best describes your experience, background or
knowledge with respect to contracts outside of your role as a consumer?
less than more
very avg than avg
uncomfortabl perso average p n ex erl Total
male Count 2 4 59 35 3 103
% within Gender 1.9% 3.9% 57.3% 34.0% 2.9% 100.0%





% of Total .7% 1.30/ 19.3% 11.4% 1.0%/ 33.7%
female Count 7 25 114 52 5 203
% within Gender 3.4% 12.3% 56.2% 25.6% 2.5% 100.0%





% of Total 2.3% 8.2/ 37.3% 17.0% 1.60/ 66.3%
fotal Count 9 29 173 87 8 306
% within Gender 2.9% 9.5% 56.5% 28.4% 2.6% 100.0%





% of Total 2.90/ 9.5% 56.50/ 28.4/ 2.6/ 100.00/
Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std. Error" Approx. TI Approx. Sig.
rdinal by Ordinal Kendall's tau-b -.125 .052 -2.391 .01
of Valid Cases 306
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
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